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STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE OF THE PRIOR FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DE-ACCELERATE THE DEBT, INSTANT FORECLOSURE ACTION IS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the prior action for foreclosure accelerated the debt and the subsequent stipulation of discontinuance did not de-accelerate the debt. The instant foreclosure action was therefore time-barred:

… [D]efendant established that the six-year statute of limitations began to run on the entire debt on April 21, 2008, the date the plaintiff accelerated the mortgage debt by commencing the prior action … . Since the plaintiff did not commence this action until December 15, 2015, more than six years later, the defendant sustained his initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that this action was untimely … . The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to present admissible evidence establishing that the action was timely or to raise a question of fact as to whether the action was timely … .

The plaintiff failed to meet its burden. Contrary to its contention, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether it affirmatively revoked its election to accelerate the mortgage within the six-year limitations period. Its execution of the stipulation of discontinuance did not, by itself, constitute an affirmative act to revoke its election to accelerate, since the stipulation was silent on the issue of the election to accelerate, and did not otherwise indicate that the plaintiff would accept installment payments from the defendant … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Craig, 2019 NY Slip Op 00846 [169 AD3d 627], Second Dept 2-6-19

 

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