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PRIOR FLORIDA CONVICTION WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A NEW YORK FELONY, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant should not have been sentenced as a second felony offender because the prior Florida conviction was not the equivalent of a New York felony. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and attempted robbery:

The knowledge element of the Florida statute at the time of defendant’s Florida offense was that a defendant “knew of the illicit nature of the items in his possession” … . This was broader than the knowledge requirement under Penal Law § 220.16, which demands proof of “knowledge that the item at issue was, in fact, the controlled substance the defendant is charged with selling or possessing” … . Contrary to the trial court’s analysis, the dispositive difference between the knowledge requirements of the Florida and New York statutes was in place at the time of defendant’s 1998 Florida conviction. Florida’s alteration of its knowledge requirement in 2002 (see Fla Stat Ann § 893.101) has no bearing on our analysis. People v Muhammad, 2019 NY Slip Op 00386, First Dept 1-22-19

 

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