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PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) WHEN A BRIDGE FORM HE WAS UNLOADING FELL ON HIM, PLAINTIFF MADE A SUFFICIENT SHOWING OF LONG-ARM JURISDICTION TO WARRANT DISCOVERY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action were properly dismissed because plaintiff’s decedent was not involved in construction work when a 2500 pound bridge form fell on him. The court further found that plaintiff had made a sufficient showing that long-arm jurisdiction may apply to Spillman, the manufacturer of the bridge form, to allow discovery:

In support of her claimed violations of Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6), plaintiff alleged that, at the time that decedent sustained the fatal injuries, he had been unloading a bridge form that had been delivered to the manufacturing facility operated by LHV so that it could be used in the manufacture and fabrication of construction materials that would be eventually used during unspecified construction at an unspecified construction site. As Supreme Court aptly concluded, these allegations “do not support any contention that the work being done at the time of the incident was, in any manner, an integral part of an ongoing construction contract or was being performed at an ancillary site, incidental to and necessitated by such construction project, where the materials involved were being readied for use in connection with a covered activity,” so as to bring it within the ambit of Labor Law § 240 (1) … . …

For the same reasons, plaintiff’s factual allegations did not support a conclusion that decedent’s injuries occurred in an “area[] in which construction, excavation or demolition work [was] being performed” (Labor Law § 241 [b]) and, thus, Supreme Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claim was proper … . …

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, we agree with Supreme Court that the foregoing provided the “sufficient start” required to warrant further discovery on the issue of whether personal jurisdiction may be properly exercised over Spillman under CPLR 302 (a) (3), while also comporting with federal due process requirements … . Archer-Vail v LHV Precast Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 00341, Third Dept 1-17-19

 

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