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EVIDENCE OF PRIOR UNCHARGED SEXUAL OFFENSES WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER MOLINEUX, HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF VICTIM’S DISCLOSURE TWO AND A HALF YEARS AFTER THE ALLEGED INCIDENT WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS A PROMPT OUTCRY, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined detailed evidence of prior uncharged sexual offenses was not admissible under Molineux. The defendant was charged with criminal sexual act alleging defendant asked a six or seven year old boy to perform oral sex on him. The People presented in their direct case the testimony of two female relatives of the defendant alleging sexual offenses occurring more than seven years before the victim’s disclosure in the instant case. County Court also erroneously allowed hearsay about the victim’s disclosure, two and a half years after the alleged incident, under the prompt outcry exception to the hearsay rule:

The female relatives specifically testified to repeated instances of oral sex, vaginal sex and digital penetration by defendant, and one of the female relatives stated that defendant forced her and the other female relative to perform sexual acts upon each other as he watched. Contrary to County Court’s conclusion, such detailed testimony was not necessary to complete the narrative as to how and why the victim’s disclosure occurred … . Additionally, the prior uncharged acts did not bear a sufficient similarity to the incident underlying the charged crimes so as to constitute, as the People argued, a common scheme or plan or demonstrate defendant’s intent or motive … . Accordingly, as the People failed to establish that the proffered evidence was probative of a material issue other than defendant’s criminal propensity, County Court erred in permitting such evidence … . Moreover, even if the proffered evidence were relevant to some nonpropensity purpose, County Court erroneously determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect … . People v Saxe, 2019 NY Slip Op 05345, Third Dept 7-3-19

 

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