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CROSS-MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS PURSUANT TO CPLR 306-b IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE HAD BEEN VACATED BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED INITIALLY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined the judgment of foreclosure should have been vacated because defendant was not served and therefore the court did not acquire personal jurisdiction. However, plaintiff’s timely cross-motion to extend the time for service pursuant to CPLR 306-b was properly granted:

“If service is not made upon a defendant within the time provided in [CPLR 306-b], the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service” … . Good cause requires the plaintiff to demonstrate, as a threshold matter, “reasonably diligent efforts” in attempting to effect service … . In deciding whether, in the interest of justice, to grant an extension of time to serve a summons and complaint, “the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the [potentially] meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant” … . “A determination of whether to grant the extension in the interest of justice is generally within the discretion of the motion court” … . Bank United, FSB v Verbitsky, 2018 NY Slip Op 08623, Second Dept 12-19-18

 

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