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CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS EASEMENT AND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXPLAINED, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that neither plaintiff nor defendants were entitled to summary judgment in this dispute over an plaintiff’s ingress and egress easement over defendants’ land. The court explained the criteria for interpretation of an express easement and a prescriptive easement. The court noted that plaintiff was properly sanctioned for her counsel’s conduct in filing an amended complaint which differed from the complaint approved by the court:

,,, [T]he plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the amended complaint, arguing, in effect, that the language of the express easement should be amended to include certain curves in the right of way that were necessary to permit utility and delivery trucks to access the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff argued that she had obtained a prescriptive easement over the portions of the defendants’ property which underlaid the proposed curves. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment declaring that the plaintiff was not entitled to an expansion of the easement, by prescription or otherwise. …

“Easements by express grant are construed to give effect to the parties’ intent, as manifested by the language of the grant” … . “The extent of an easement claimed under a grant is generally limited by the language of the grant, as a grantor may create an extensive or a limited easement”… . “Where, as here, an easement provides for the ingress and egress of motor vehicles, it is granted in general terms and the extent of its use includes any reasonable use necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it is created'” … .

“An easement by prescription may be demonstrated by clear and convincing proof of the adverse, open and notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the subject property for the prescriptive period” … . DiDonato v Dyckman, 2018 NY Slip Op 08113, Second Dept 11-28-18

REAL PROPERTY LAW (EASEMENTS, CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS EASEMENT AND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXPLAINED, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/EXPRESS EASEMENTS ( CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS EASEMENT AND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXPLAINED, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS (CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS EASEMENT AND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXPLAINED, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (SANCTIONS, ATTORNEY’S FEES, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))

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