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WHERE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INJURED PLAINTIFF’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BECAUSE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, THE ISSUE MUST FIRST BE DECIDED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, NOT THE COURTS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a question of fact whether the injured plaintiff was an employee or an independent contractor (and therefore a question of fact whether the Workers’ Compensation was plaintiff’s exclusive remedy) must ruled on by the Workers’ Compensation Board before the courts can get involved:

Where the availability of workers’ compensation benefits “hinges upon questions of fact or upon mixed questions of fact and law, the parties may not choose the courts as the forum for resolution of the questions, but must look to the Workers’ Compensation Board for such determinations”… . “The question of whether a particular person is an employee within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law is usually a question of fact to be resolved by the Workers’ Compensation Board” … . Here, in light of the affidavit of the defendant’s employee, who stated that he trained the plaintiff, supervised the plaintiff closely, set the plaintiff’s hours on the days the plaintiff worked, and directed the plaintiff’s work, there is a question of fact regarding whether the plaintiff was the defendant’s employee on the date of the accident. Accordingly, because “there is a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff has a valid negligence cause of action against the defendant,” “[t]hat determination must be made in the first instance by the Workers’ Compensation Board …”. Findlater v Catering by Michael Schick, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07702, Second Dept 11-14-18

WORKERS” COMPENSATION (WHERE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INJURED PLAINTIFF’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BECAUSE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, THE ISSUE MUST FIRST BE DECIDED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, NOT THE COURTS (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, WHERE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INJURED PLAINTIFF’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BECAUSE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, THE ISSUE MUST FIRST BE DECIDED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, NOT THE COURTS (SECOND DEPT))/INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, WHERE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INJURED PLAINTIFF’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BECAUSE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, THE ISSUE MUST FIRST BE DECIDED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, NOT THE COURTS (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, WHERE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INJURED PLAINTIFF’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BECAUSE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, THE ISSUE MUST FIRST BE DECIDED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, NOT THE COURTS (SECOND DEPT))

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