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DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE SECURITY COMPANY ALLEGEDLY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF.

The Second Department determined defendant Arrow Security, a company under contract with defendant theater, Paramount, to provide security for patrons, was not entitled to a dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff, an employee of Paramount, alleged he was instructed by Arrow to restrain a person, John Doe, who was in the rear alley of the theater premises. Plaintiff alleged he was beaten and injured by John Doe. The contract between Arrow and Paramount specifically stated the contract did not create a duty owed to third parties. However, the court concluded the complaint stated a claim for common-law negligence because it was alleged Arrow directed plaintiff to restrain John Doe:

… Arrow failed to conclusively establish that it owed no common-law duty to the plaintiff. To the contrary, the allegations in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff … , set forth a cognizable legal theory under which Arrow could be found to have assumed a duty of care to the plaintiff by calling for and instructing him to investigate, restrain, and/or detain the intoxicated John Doe … . A duty of care may be assumed where a “defendant’s conduct placed plaintiff in a more vulnerable position than plaintiff would have been in had defendant done nothing” … , or where a defendant’s conduct “enhanced the risk that plaintiff faced, created a new risk or induced plaintiff to forego some opportunity to avoid risk” … . Garda v Paramount Theatre, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08841, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/CONTRACT, TORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM (DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/ASSAULT (NEGLIGENCE, DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/DUTY (NEGLIGENCE, DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)

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