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DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TREATMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 35-YEAR SENTENCE WAS HARSH AND EXCESSIVE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to sentence youthful offender treatment. The majority deemed the 35 year sentence excessive and directed that the sentences be served concurrently. The dissenters argued that the sentences were not excessive:

CPL 720.10 (3) provides that “a youth who has been convicted of an armed felony offense . . . is an eligible youth if the court determines that one or more of the following factors exist: (i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed; or (ii) where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime, the defendant’s participation was relatively minor although not so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.” Contrary to defendant’s contention, “traditional sentencing factors, such as the criminal’s age, background and criminal history, are not appropriate to the mitigating circumstances analysis . . . Rather, the court must rely only on factors related to the defendant’s conduct in committing the crime, such as a lack of injury to others or evidence that the defendant did not display a weapon during the crime”… , or other factors that are directly related to the crime of which defendant was convicted … . Here, we perceive no basis to disturb the court’s determination that defendant is not an eligible youth because, in the first crime of which he was convicted, “defendant carried a gun to an encounter with known gang members, displayed the gun, . . . and . . . fired a shot that struck one of the” gang members… , and he was again armed with a loaded weapon when he was arrested several weeks later. …

The victim in this case is a rival gang member who attempted to rob members of defendant’s gang. Defendant arrived at the scene of the attempted robbery and shot at the victim, who was struck by a bullet but survived. Defendant obviously deserves a stern sentence but, in our view, 35 years is too severe. Indeed, the maximum punishment for intentional murder is 25 years to life … . Defendant has no prior criminal record (he was adjudicated a youthful offender on a misdemeanor), he was only 18 years old when he committed the crimes, and the People offered him a 20-year sentence prior to trial as part of a plea bargain. Under the circumstances, and considering that the victim was attempting to commit an armed robbery when he was shot, we conclude that defendant’s sentence is unduly harsh and severe. People v Jones, 2018 NY Slip Op 07556, Fourth Dept 11-9-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TREATMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 35-YEAR SENTENCE WAS HARSH AND EXCESSIVE (FOURTH DEPT))/YOUTHFUL OFFENDER DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TREATMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 35-YEAR SENTENCE WAS HARSH AND EXCESSIVE (FOURTH DEPT))/SENTENCING (HARSH AND EXCESSIVE, DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TREATMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 35-YEAR SENTENCE WAS HARSH AND EXCESSIVE (FOURTH DEPT))/YOUTHFUL OFFENDER DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TREATMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 35-YEAR SENTENCE WAS HARSH AND EXCESSIVE (FOURTH DEPT))/HARSH AND EXCESSIVE SENTENCE (DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TREATMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 35-YEAR SENTENCE WAS HARSH AND EXCESSIVE (FOURTH DEPT))

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