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STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE INVALIDATED, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF CHANGED HER MIND BEFORE THE STIPULATION WAS FILED, NO EVIDENCE OF DURESS, FRAUD, MISTAKE, OVERREACHING (SECOND DEPT).

he Second Department determined a stipulation of settlement entered by plaintiff’s attorney was a binding contract. The fact that plaintiff changed her mind before the stipulation was filed was of no consequence. Plaintiff made no effort to demonstrate the contract was invalid due to duress, fraud, mistake or overreaching:

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, to vacate the stipulation of discontinuance. CPLR 2104 provides that, “[a]n agreement between parties or their attorneys relating to any matter in an action, other than one between counsel in open court, is not binding upon a party unless it is in a writing subscribed by him or his attorney or reduced to the form of an order and entered.” Here, there is no dispute that on October 30, 2015, the plaintiff’s former counsel had actual authority from his client to enter into the stipulation discontinuing the action on her behalf … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the stipulation of discontinuance clearly evidenced the plaintiff’s intent to discontinue the action as of October 30, 2015, notwithstanding that she changed her mind prior to the filing of the stipulation on November 2, 2015 … , even though it did not effect a discontinuance until it was filed with the clerk of the court on November 2, 2015 (CPLR 3217[a][2]). In seeking to vacate the stipulation, the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to establish good cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as that the stipulation was the result of duress, fraud, mistake, or overreaching, or that the terms of the stipulation were unconscionable … . Demetriou v Wolfer, 2018 NY Slip Op 07288, Second Dept 10-31-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE INVALIDATED, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF CHANGED HER MIND BEFORE THE STIPULATION WAS FILED, NO EVIDENCE OF DURESS, FRAUD, MISTAKE, OVERREACHING (SECOND DEPT))/DISCONTINUANCE (STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE INVALIDATED, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF CHANGED HER MIND BEFORE THE STIPULATION WAS FILED, NO EVIDENCE OF DURESS, FRAUD, MISTAKE, OVERREACHING (SECOND DEPT))/STIPULATIONS (STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE INVALIDATED, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF CHANGED HER MIND BEFORE THE STIPULATION WAS FILED, NO EVIDENCE OF DURESS, FRAUD, MISTAKE, OVERREACHING (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE INVALIDATED, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF CHANGED HER MIND BEFORE THE STIPULATION WAS FILED, NO EVIDENCE OF DURESS, FRAUD, MISTAKE, OVERREACHING (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 2103, CPLR 3217 (STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE INVALIDATED, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF CHANGED HER MIND BEFORE THE STIPULATION WAS FILED, NO EVIDENCE OF DURESS, FRAUD, MISTAKE, OVERREACHING (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE INVALIDATED, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF CHANGED HER MIND BEFORE THE STIPULATION WAS FILED, NO EVIDENCE OF DURESS, FRAUD, MISTAKE, OVERREACHING (SECOND DEPT)

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