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Foreign Corporation’s Sole Residence for Venue Purposes Is the County Designated In Its Filed Application to Conduct Business in New York State

In the context of a dispute over proper venue, the Second Department determined that plaintiff foreign corporation’s sole residence in New York State is the county designated in its application for authority to conduct business in New York State as filed with the State. Therefore plaintiff’s bringing the action in Nassau County, where it alleged its principal place of business is located, as opposed to New York County, the county designated in its filed application, was improper:

…[T]he law is clear that “[f]or purposes of venue, the sole residence of a foreign corporation is the county in which its principal office is located, as designated in its application for authority to conduct business filed with the State of New York” …, regardless of where it transacts business or maintains its actual principal office (see CPLR 503[c]; Business Corporation Law § 102[a][10]…). We note that, since the plaintiff’s response to the defendants’ demand to change venue failed to set forth factual averments that were prima facie sufficient to show that its designation of Nassau County for trial of the action was proper, the defendants were authorized to notice their motion to change venue to be heard in Saratoga County (see CPLR 511[b]…). Further, the defendants are not responsible for the delay occasioned by the denial of their motion by the Supreme Court, Saratoga County.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion to change the venue of the action from Nassau County to Saratoga County, despite the fact that an order granting class certification had already been issued in the action. American Bldrs. & Contrs. Supply Co., Inc. v Capitaland Home Improvement Showroom, LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 04262, 2nd Dept 5-20-15

 

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