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PLAINTIFF, AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE AGREEMENT, HAD STANDING TO BRING THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, DESPITE THE BOILERPLATE EXCLUSION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh too complex to fairly summarize here, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary to the contract, despite the boilerplate exclusion of third-party beneficiaries:

…[W]e reject defendant's contention that plaintiff does not have standing to sue for breach of the [agreement] because it is not a party to that agreement. Plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary of the [agreement], as that agreement explicitly refers to plaintiff and grants it enforceable rights. Accordingly, the [agreement's] boilerplate exclusion of third-party beneficiaries does not apply to plaintiff, and this action may not be properly dismissed for lack of standing … . MPEG LA, LLC v Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2018 NY Slip Op 06147, First Dept 9-19-18 

CONTRACT LAW (PLAINTIFF, AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE AGREEMENT, HAD STANDING TO BRING THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, DESPITE THE BOILERPLATE EXCLUSION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES (FIRST DEPT))/THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY (CONTRACT LAW, PLAINTIFF, AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE AGREEMENT, HAD STANDING TO BRING THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, DESPITE THE BOILERPLATE EXCLUSION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF WAS GRANTED A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THIS ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE... NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF...