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ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S LEAD VEHICLE STOPPED FOR NO APPARENT REASON RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE REAR-END COLLISION.

The Second Department determined that defendant’s (Balenescu’s) allegation that plaintiff (Galuten, who was in the lead vehicle) suddenly stopped for no apparent reason raised a question of fact about whether plaintiff’s negligence caused or contributed to the accident:

Mere evidence of a sudden stop, without more, is not enough to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the operator of the stopped vehicle was partly at fault, so as to defeat summary judgment … . However, while vehicle stops under prevailing traffic conditions are forseeable and must be anticipated by the following driver, where the sudden stop is unexplained by the existing circumstances and conditions, an issue of fact as to liability is raised … .

Here, Balenescu averred, inter alia, that when he was “25 yards from the Galuten vehicle, still traveling at 15 miles per hour, the light turned green, and the Galuten vehicle . . . accelerated safely through the intersection into the next block.” Then about 10 yards past the intersection of West 23rd Street and 12th Avenue, the Galuten vehicle suddenly stopped short “for no apparent reason,” as there was no traffic “for fifty yards in front of the Galuten vehicle,” and the Galuten vehicle showed no signs, nor made any signals, to signify that it was stopping. This evidence was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Galuten’s alleged negligence caused or contributed to the accident … . Etingof v Metropolitan Laundry Mach. Sales, Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 08803, 2nd Dept 12-2-15

NEGLIGENCE (REAR-END COLLISION, UNEXPLAINED STOP)/REAR-END COLLISION (UNEXPLAINED STOP)

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