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You are here: Home1 / Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)2 / CRITERIA FOR AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE EXPLAINED, CRITERIA FOR STANDING IN...
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

CRITERIA FOR AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE EXPLAINED, CRITERIA FOR STANDING IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE IS NOT THE SAME AS IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the causes of action concerning an equitable mortgage should not have been granted in this action to quiet title. The court noted that the criteria for standing in an action to quiet title is not the same as in a foreclosure action.  The facts are too complicated to fairly summarize here:

“New York law allows the imposition of an equitable lien if there is an express or implied agreement that there shall be a lien on specific property” … . “While [a] court will impose an equitable mortgage where the facts surrounding a transaction evidence that the parties intended that a specific piece of property is to be held or transferred to secure an obligation, it is necessary that an intention to create such a charge clearly appear from the language and the attendant circumstances” … . …

… Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to substitute Fannie Mae as the plaintiff on the ground that Fannie Mae lacked standing. In reaching its conclusion, the court erroneously applied the standard used to establish standing in mortgage foreclosure actions. “Standing to commence the foreclosure action is not properly raised in this action to quiet title” …  Since the plaintiff sufficiently established that Fannie Mae “claims an estate or interest” in the subject property (see RPAPL 1501[1]), that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to substitute Fannie Mae as the plaintiff should have been granted.  JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Bank of Am., 2018 NY Slip Op 05670, Second Dept 8-8-18

REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (CRITERIA FOR AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE EXPLAINED, CRITERIA FOR STANDING IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE IS NOT THE SAME AS IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/QUIET TITLE (CRITERIA FOR AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE EXPLAINED, CRITERIA FOR STANDING IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE IS NOT THE SAME AS IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/STANDING (QUIET TITLE, CRITERIA FOR AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE EXPLAINED, CRITERIA FOR STANDING IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE IS NOT THE SAME AS IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/EQUITABLE MORTGAGE (CRITERIA FOR AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE EXPLAINED, CRITERIA FOR STANDING IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE IS NOT THE SAME AS IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

August 8, 2018
Tags: Second Department
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