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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case should have been granted. The court noted that a plaintiff is not longer required to demonstrate the absence of comparative fault to be entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff was in the first stopped car. The car behind plaintiff (CCAP/Rosenthal) was also stopped but was struck from behind by a third car (Auto Mall/Edri):

A plaintiff in a negligence action moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability must establish, prima facie, that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff and that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged injuries … . A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault in establishing his or her prima facie case … . A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision in order to rebut the inference of negligence … .

The plaintiff’s affidavit submitted in support of his motion established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff’s affidavit demonstrated that he was stopped for between 5 and 10 seconds due to traffic related conditions before his vehicle was struck in the rear by the CCAP/Rosenthal vehicle. The plaintiff’s affidavit also demonstrated that the vehicle operated by Edri struck the rear of the stopped vehicle owned by CCAP and operated by Rosenthal, which propelled that vehicle into the rear of the plaintiff’s stopped vehicle. In opposition, Auto Mall and Edri failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision. Furthermore, the contention of Auto Mall and Edri that the plaintiff’s motion was premature pursuant to CPLR 3212(f) is unpersuasive. Auto Mall and Edri failed to demonstrate how discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the plaintiff’s knowledge or control … . Tsyganash v Auto Mall Fleet Mgt., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 05517, Second Dept 7-25-18

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE (SECOND DEPT))/REAR-END COLLISIONS (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE (SECOND DEPT))

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