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ATTORNEY’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW BECAUSE OF CLIENT’S FAILURE TO PAY AND LACK OF COOPERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the appellant-attorney’s motion for permission to withdraw from representing plaintiff-client should have been granted. The attorney had submitted upwards of $40,000 in bills. Plaintiff did not pay any of the bills and refused to provide documents requested by the attorney. In addition, plaintiff did not oppose the attorney’s motion to withdraw:

” The decision to grant or deny permission for counsel to withdraw lies within the discretion of the trial court, and the court’s decision should not be overturned absent a showing of an improvident exercise of discretion'” … . “An attorney may be permitted to withdraw from employment where a client refuses to pay reasonable legal fees” … . “Additionally, an attorney may withdraw from representing a client if the client fails to cooperate in the representation or otherwise renders the representation unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out employment effectively'” … . Applebaum v Einstein, 2018 NY Slip Op 05437, Second Dept 7-25-18

ATTORNEYS (ATTORNEY’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW BECAUSE OF CLIENT’S FAILURE TO PAY AND LACK OF COOPERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CLIENTS (ATTORNEYS, ATTORNEY’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW BECAUSE OF CLIENT’S FAILURE TO PAY AND LACK OF COOPERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION,... PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE (SECOND...