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COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the county was not entitled to summary judgment in this intersection collision case. Plaintiff alleged her field of vision was blocked by snow piled at the intersection. The county demonstrated it did not have written notice of the condition, but did not demonstrate it did not create the condition:

Where ” a municipality has enacted a prior written notice statute, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by an improperly maintained street . . . unless it has received written notice of the defect, or an exception to the written notice requirement applies'”… . As relevant here, an exception to the prior written notice laws exists where the municipality creates the defective condition through an affirmative act of negligence … . Here, the plaintiff alleged that the County affirmatively caused or contributed to the dangerous condition through its snow plowing operations, which caused snow to be piled unreasonably high at the intersection. Therefore, to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the County was required to demonstrate, prima facie, that it did not receive prior written notice of the alleged dangerous condition and that it did not create the alleged dangerous condition … . Although the County demonstrated, prima facie, that it did not receive prior written notice, the County’s submissions failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that its snow removal operations did not create a dangerous condition … . Manzella v County of Suffolk, 2018 NY Slip Op 05296, Second Dept 7-18-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW,  COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION... ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INDICATED SHE DID NOT KNOW THE CAUSE OF HER FALL IN HER DEPOSITION,...