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Defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights Violated When Officer Opened an Envelope Containing Defendant’s Personal Belongings at the Hospital Where Defendant Was Being Treated—The Fact that the Officer Thought Defendant Was a Crime Victim at the Time Does Not Matter—The Personal Belongings, Which Included Evidence of a Robbery, Should Have Been Suppressed

The Second Department determined the contents of an envelope containing defendant’s personal belongings, which included evidence of a robbery of which defendant was convicted, should have been suppressed.  The defendant was in the hospital when the police officer asked for identification.  The defendant indicated his belongings had been taken by the hospital.  The officer then retrieved the envelope from the hospital security office and opened it.  The Second Department determined that the fact that the officer thought the defendant was a crime victim (he had been stabbed) at the time he opened the envelope did not change the fact that the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were thereby violated:

“On a motion by a defendant to suppress physical evidence, the People have the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance” … . The People failed to meet their burden in this instance.

Initially, we note that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal belongings, notwithstanding the fact that he was a hospital patient and his belongings were being temporarily stored in the hospital’s security office … . In addition, the fact that the officer perceived the defendant to be a victim rather than a suspect did not strip the defendant of Fourth Amendment protection … . People v Alston, 2014 NY Slip Op 08344, 2nd Dept 11-26-14

 

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