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THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED WITH REVIEWING AN X-RAY OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S CHEST ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INFORM THE DECEDENT OR HIS PHYSICIAN OF THE CANCER FINDINGS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice DeJoseph, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the medical professionals involved with review of an x-ray of plaintiff’s decedent’s chest on behalf of plaintiff’s decedent’s employer did not have a duty to report the findings to the decedent or decedent’s physician. The mass that was seen on the x-ray apparently was cancer and plaintiff’s decedent was not informed. He later asked his employer, NYSEG, about the findings but by then the cancer was incurable:

The chest x ray was performed at defendant Lockport Memorial Hospital and decedent signed a consent form prior to the procedure. The consent form provided, in pertinent part, the following: “I, [decedent], understand that medical examinations done at this facility are for evaluation purposes for either employment suitability or worker’s compensation injury/illness treatment. The examinations done here are not intended to detect all underlying health conditions and do not replace the medical care provided by my personal physician. I hereby consent to the examination for the stated purposes or request the services stipulated of [WNYOM]. Furthermore, I understand that all medical information related to my ability to perform the functions of my job will be reported to the designated employer representatives at my place of employment.” …

“The failure to communicate significant medical findings to a patient or his treating physician is not malpractice but ordinary negligence” … . * * *

… [T]there is no dispute that defendants correctly interpreted the results of the x ray and timely conveyed the results to decedent’s employer. Notably absent from the record is the identity or even existence of decedent’s treating physician. Nor is there any indication that defendants were made aware of any treating physician. Furthermore, the consent form, executed by decedent, specifically indicated that decedent “underst[oo]d that all medical information related to [his] ability to perform the functions of [his] job w[ould] be reported to the designated employer representatives at [his] place of employment.” There is also no dispute that defendants adhered to the requirements set forth in the consent form. We therefore conclude that … there was no duty to decedent and, as stated by the Court of Appeals, “[w]e have been reluctant to expand a doctor’s duty of care to a patient to encompass nonpatients. A critical concern underlying this reluctance is the danger that a recognition of a duty would render doctors liable to a prohibitive number of possible plaintiffs” … . Kingsley v Price, 2018 NY Slip Op 05088, Fourth Dept 7-6-18

​NEGLIGENCE (THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED WITH REVIEWING AN X-RAY OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S CHEST ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INFORM THE DECEDENT OR HIS PHYSICIAN OF THE CANCER FINDINGS (FOURTH DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW  (THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED WITH REVIEWING AN X-RAY OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S CHEST ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INFORM THE DECEDENT OR HIS PHYSICIAN OF THE CANCER FINDINGS (FOURTH DEPT))

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