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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED THE CONTESTED PROMOTION OF A SHERIFF’S DISPATCHER WAS ARBITRABLE UNDER THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petitioner-county’s motion to permanently stay arbitration should not have been granted. The respondent-union filed a grievance on behalf of a part-time sheriff’s dispatcher when another dispatcher was made full-time:

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The Court of Appeals has set forth a two-pronged test to determine “whether a grievance is arbitrable” (Matter of City of Johnstown [Johnstown Police Benevolent Assn.], 99 NY2d 273, 278 [Johnstown] …). In the first prong of the test, known as “the may-they-arbitrate’ prong,” we “ask whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance” … . If we conclude that arbitration is not prohibited, we move to the second prong, known as “the did-they-agree-to-arbitrate’ prong,” in which we “examine the CBA to determine if the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue” … .

Here, petitioner does not contend that arbitration of [the dispatcher’s] grievance is prohibited, and we therefore are concerned only with the second prong of the Johnstown test. With respect to that issue, “[i]t is well settled that, in deciding an application to stay or compel arbitration under CPLR 7503, the court is concerned only with the threshold determination of arbitrability, and not with the merits of the underlying claim”… . Furthermore, “[w]here, as here, there is a broad arbitration clause and a reasonable relationship’ between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the parties’ [CBA], the court should rule the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the [CBA], and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them’ ” … . Matter of Lewis County (CSEA Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Lewis County Sheriff’s Empls. Unit #7250-03, Lewis County Local 825), 2017 NY Slip Op 06743, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

 

ARBITRATION (COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED THE CONTESTED PROMOTION OF A SHERIFF’S DISPATCHER WAS ARBITRABLE UNDER THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (FOURTH DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED THE CONTESTED PROMOTION OF A SHERIFF’S DISPATCHER WAS ARBITRABLE UNDER THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW  (COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED THE CONTESTED PROMOTION OF A SHERIFF’S DISPATCHER WAS ARBITRABLE UNDER THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (FOURTH DEPT))/COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (ARBITRATION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED THE CONTESTED PROMOTION OF A SHERIFF’S DISPATCHER WAS ARBITRABLE UNDER THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (FOURTH DEPT))/UNIONS (ARBITRATION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED THE CONTESTED PROMOTION OF A SHERIFF’S DISPATCHER WAS ARBITRABLE UNDER THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (FOURTH DEPT))

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