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PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO A VARIANCE ON FINANCIAL HARDSHIP GROUNDS, REGULATORY TAKING CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s application for a variance should have been granted on financial hardship grounds, but the action alleging a regulatory taking was not ripe, an issue which can be raised on appeal for the first time. Petitioner demonstrated the character of the surrounding area had changed from residential to commercial over the past 30 years rendering the property unmarketable as residential property:

The ZBA [zoning board of appeals] actually agreed that “the location of this property on a corner may impact its value,” and its ultimate conclusion that the financial hardship was not unique seemingly ran counter to that observation … . Moreover, in light of the proof that the need for a use variance only arose decades after the property was acquired due to a gradual shift in the character of the area that rendered the permitted residential use onerous and obsolete, petitioners sufficiently alleged “that the hardship identified by [them] . . . was [not] self-created” … . Accepting the foregoing as true, as we must, petitioners stated a viable claim attacking the ZBA’s determination.

… [T]he remaining regulatory taking claim must be dismissed. The petition/complaint states, and petitioners’ arguments on appeal reflect, that the owner’s taking claim is solely premised upon a deprivation of rights afforded under the Federal Constitution (see US Const 5th Amend; 42 USC § 1983). In order for a 42 USC § 1983 claim based upon a regulatory taking to be ripe, however, it is necessary for a petitioner/plaintiff to “demonstrate that [he or] she has both received a ‘final decision regarding the application of the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue’ from ‘the government entity charged with implementing the regulations,’ and sought ‘compensation through the procedures the [s]tate has provided for doing so'”… . The denial of the application for a use variance constituted a final decision regarding the application of the zoning regulations to its property… , but there is no indication that the owner then asserted a state claim for inverse condemnation… . Thus, inasmuch as ripeness is a “matter[] pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction which can be raised at any time” and the second cause of action founded upon 42 USC § 1983 is “unripe because [the owner] failed to seek compensation from the [s]tate before” asserting it… , it must be dismissed. Matter of 54 Marion Ave., LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 2018 NY Slip Op 04611, Third Dept 6-21-18

​ZONING (PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO A VARIANCE ON FINANCIAL HARDSHIP GROUNDS, REGULATORY TAKING CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/VARIANCE (ZONING, PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO A VARIANCE ON FINANCIAL HARDSHIP GROUNDS, REGULATORY TAKING CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (RIPENESS, PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO A VARIANCE ON FINANCIAL HARDSHIP GROUNDS, REGULATORY TAKING CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/RIPENESS (REGULATORY TAKING, PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO A VARIANCE ON FINANCIAL HARDSHIP GROUNDS, REGULATORY TAKING CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/REGULATORY TAKING (RIPENESS, PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO A VARIANCE ON FINANCIAL HARDSHIP GROUNDS, REGULATORY TAKING CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (RIPENESS, PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO A VARIANCE ON FINANCIAL HARDSHIP GROUNDS, REGULATORY TAKING CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT))

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