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BURDENS OF PROOF IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE INVOLVING THREE CARS (SECOND DEPT).

In a rear-end collision case involving three cars and motions and cross motions for summary judgment, the Second Department carefully laid out the burdens of proof on summary judgment motions in this context, as well as the applicability of comparative negligence in this context. The plaintiff’s car was stopped and was struck in the rear by the Ramos car. Ramos alleged the Nisanov car was on the shoulder and the collision happened when Ramos avoided collision with the Nisanov car. The Nisanov defendants alleged plaintiff was comparatively negligent. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in the action against Ramos, and plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the affirmative defense of the Nisamov defendants alleging plaintiff’s comparative negligence:

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment on a cause of action asserted in a complaint generally has the burden of establishing, prima facie, “all of the essential elements of the cause of action”… . By contrast, a defendant moving for summary judgment dismissing one of the plaintiff’s causes of action may generally sustain his or her prima facie burden “by negating a single essential element” of that cause of action … . To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party need only rebut the prima facie showing made by the moving party so as to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact … . …

Ramos’s version of the accident raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Dayan Nisanov was free from fault in the happening of the accident… . Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny that branch of the Nisanov defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them on the ground that they were not at fault in the happening of the accident. …

Inasmuch as the deposition testimony of Dayan Nisanov and the plaintiff indicated that Dayan Nisanov was not negligent in the operation of his vehicle, while the deposition testimony of Ramos indicated that Dayan Nisanov was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, the plaintiff’s submissions failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Dayan Nisanov was negligent and, if so, whether any such negligence caused or contributed to the accident … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the complaint insofar as asserted against the Nisanov defendants … .

Although a plaintiff need not demonstrate the absence of his or her own comparative negligence to be entitled to partial summary judgment as to a defendant’s liability… , the issue of a plaintiff’s comparative negligence may be decided in the context of a summary judgment motion where, as here, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment dismissing a defendant’s affirmative defense of comparative negligence  … . Poon v Nisanov, 2018 NY Slip Op 04365, Second Dept 6-13-18

​NEGLIGENCE (BURDENS OF PROOF IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE INVOLVING THREE CARS (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (BURDENS OF PROOF IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE INVOLVING THREE CARS (SECOND DEPT))/REAR-END COLLISIONS  (BURDENS OF PROOF IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE INVOLVING THREE CARS (SECOND DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE INVOLVING THREE CARS (SECOND DEPT))/COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE INVOLVING THREE CARS (SECOND DEPT))

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