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SUBTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AMOUNT OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE AMOUNT OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A LABOR LAW 200/COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION.

The Second Department determined defendant general contractor (Metro) was not entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action, but was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 and common law negligence causes of action. Plaintiff was injured when the knot on a rope he was tied to while pushing snow off a roof gave way and he fell three stories. The decision illustrates the subtle difference between the amount of supervisory control necessary to hold a general contractor liable under Labor Law 240(1) and the greater amount of supervisory control necessary to hold a general contractor liable under Labor Law 200 and common law negligence:

 

The failure of an owner or an agent of the owner “to furnish or erect suitable devices to protect workers when work is being performed” results in absolute liability against that owner or the owner’s agent under the statute … , and the duty to provide a suitable safety device under Labor Law § 240(1), moreover, is nondelegable … . A general contractor is not considered a statutory agent of the property owner for Labor Law § 240(1) liability purposes, unless that contractor had the authority to supervise and control significant aspects of the construction project, such as safety, at the time of the accident … . …

… Metro was [demonstrated to be] a statutory agent of the property owner on the construction project through the submission of Metro’s admission that it was hired by the property owners as the general contractor on the project, and evidence that Metro undertook general contractor duties by coordinating and supervising the project, and hiring and paying subcontractors… . …

Where, as here, “a claim arises out of alleged defects or dangers in the methods or materials of the work, recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot be had under Labor Law § 200 unless it is shown that the party to be charged had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” … . “A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed” … . However, ” [t]he right to generally supervise the work, stop the contractor’s work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations and contract specifications is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence'” … . Sanchez v Metro Bldrs. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 00957, 2nd Dept 2-10-16

 

LABOR LAW (GENERAL CONTRACTOR, SUBTLE DIFFERENCE IN AMOUNT OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A LABOR LAW 240(1) VERSUS A LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION)/NEGLIGENCE (GENERAL CONTRACTOR, SUBTLE DIFFERENCE IN AMOUNT OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A LABOR LAW 240(1) VERSUS A LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION)/GENERAL CONTRACTOR (SUBTLE DIFFERENCE IN AMOUNT OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A LABOR LAW 240(1) VERSUS A LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION)

 

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