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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY TOLLED WHEN PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s action against the municipality was timely commenced. The one-year-and-ninety-day statute of limitations was tolled when plaintiff filed a successful motion for leave to file a late notice of claim:

Pursuant to General Municipal Law, a plaintiff must first serve a notice of claim against a municipality within 90 days after the claim arises … and commence any subsequent tort action against the municipality within one year and 90 days after the claim arises (see General Municipal Law § 50-i). Because plaintiff’s claims against defendants, if any, arise from the fire that occurred on February 18, 2014, he was therefore required to file and serve a notice of claim by May 19, 2014 and commence any subsequent tort action by May 19, 2015. Having failed to file and serve his notice of claim by May 19, 2014, plaintiff was permitted to, and did, commence a special proceeding seeking leave to file a late notice of claim. While the applicable one year and 90-day statute of limitations began to run on February 18, 2014, upon plaintiff’s commencement of the proceeding, the provisions of CPLR 204 (a) operated to toll the remainder of the statute of limitations until the date that the court granted the requested relief, at which point the statute began to run once again … . To put it in mathematical terms, when plaintiff commenced the proceeding seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim on November 14, 2014, he had 186 days remaining in order to timely commence this action within the applicable statute of limitations. As of that date, the statute of limitations stopped running and did not resume until May 27, 2015, when Supreme Court issued its order granting plaintiff’s application. Thus, plaintiff had 186 days running from May 27, 2015 or until November 29, 2015 to timely commence this action. Since plaintiff commenced this action on October 20, 2015, it was timely commenced and may now proceed to a determination as to whether it has any merit. Kulon v Liberty Fire Dist., 2018 NY Slip Op 04062, Third Dept 6-7-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, NOTICE OF CLAIM, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY TOLLED WHEN PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY TOLLED WHEN PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM,, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY TOLLED WHEN PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM (THIRD DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY TOLLED WHEN PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM (THIRD DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, NOTICE OF CLAIM, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY TOLLED WHEN PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM (THIRD DEPT))

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