You are here: / / DEFENDANT PROPERLY ACCUSED AND CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A SWITCHBLADE,...

DEFENDANT PROPERLY ACCUSED AND CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A SWITCHBLADE, EXTENSIVE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive dissenting opinion by Judge Rivera, affirmed defendant’s conviction for attempted possession of a weapon, i.e., a switchblade. The dissent argued that the proof at the non-jury trial and the allegations in the accusatory instrument did not demonstrate the knife met the statutory definition of a switchblade:

From the dissent:  … [T]he narrow issue presented on this appeal is whether the knife described in the accusatory instrument and at trial meets the statutory description for a per se weapon, one which is outlawed regardless of the defendant’s reasons for possession. The majority holds that the accusatory instrument is jurisdictionally sound because the knife as described meets the statutory definition of a switchblade… . I disagree. Moreover, even if the majority were correct, the evidence at trial established that the knife in question was not a switchblade within the meaning of the Penal Law. People v Berrezueta, 2018 NY Slip Op 04032, CtApp 6-7-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT PROPERLY ACCUSED AND CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A SWITCHBLADE, DISSENTING OPINION DISAGREED (CT APP))/SWITCHBLADES (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT PROPERLY ACCUSED AND CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A SWITCHBLADE, DISSENTING OPINION DISAGREED (CT APP))

You might also like
THE DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON BY RETIRED NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES TO PROVE THE CITY PROMISED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH MEDICARE SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR LIFE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS PROMISE; THEREFORE THE RETIREES WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THEIR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CAUSE OF ACTION (CT APP).
ZONING LAWS WHICH PROHIBITED DEFENDANT FROM USING HIS RURAL-DISTRICT LAND TO HOST A LARGE, THREE-DAY MUSIC AND CAMPING EVENT DID NOT VIOLATE HIS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND WERE NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS (CT APP).
UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW PRESUMPTION IN SECTION 21, AN ASSAULT AT WORK IS EMPLOYMENT-RELATED AND COMPENSABLE ABSENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE ASSAULT WAS MOTIVATED BY PERSONAL ANIMOSITY (CT APP).
FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE IN THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT DID NOT INCLUDE “UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR” LANGUAGE INDICATING THE WAIVER OF THE “AMERICAN RULE” REQUIRING EACH PARTY TO PAY THAT PARTY’S OWN ATTORNEY’S FEES; PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES ASSOCIATED WITH DEFENDANT’S UNSUCCESSFUL DISSOLUTION ACTION (CT APP).
CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CLARIFIED; EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE HERE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
PARENT CORPORATION NOT LIABLE, UNDER A STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY, FOR ASBESTOS-CONTAINING PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED AND DISTRIBUTED BY A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY.
Damages for Breach of Purchase Contract Are Measured by the Difference Between the Purchase Price and the Market Value at Time of Breach

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CITY LIABLE FOR STABBING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN PARKING GARAGE,... STATE’S FAILURE TO TAKE STEPS TO ADDRESS SAFETY PROBLEMS AT AN INTERSECTION...