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DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in an appeal by the People of a suppression ruling, determined the suppression motion should have been denied in its entirety. Defendant never made a motion to suppress information taken from his cell phone. Yet County Court apparently speculated that the police must have searched defendant’s cell phone before the Miranda warnings were given:

… [T]he detectives approached defendant outside his place of employment and asked him to accompany them to the police station. Defendant voluntarily agreed and they drove him to the station without placing him in handcuffs. The videotaped statement indicates that, during the ride and before entering the interview room, they engaged in general conversation regarding defendant’s background, education, employment and family life, but did not discuss the criminal investigation. Inside the interview room, defendant was initially not restrained. The detectives asked if he would like water and provided him a drink. Later, they obtained a cigarette and allowed him to smoke it, and permitted him to make a phone call. At the beginning of the conversation in the interview room, a detective administered Miranda warnings and defendant stated that he was willing to talk to them and answer questions. Defendant was not threatened or coerced during the interview.

County Court did not rely on these facts, but instead focused on what it deemed “the troubling and unavoidable issue that, prior to entering the interview room and prior to Miranda warnings, . . . defendant’s phone had already been seized by the police.” The court highlighted the People’s failure at the hearing to address this seizure of the phone even though, as discussed above, the People were not on notice that anything related to the phone was being challenged by defendant. The court chastised the People for failing to acknowledge or explain “the circumstances under which . . . defendant’s phone was seized and potentially searched, pre-Miranda.” The record contains no factual support for, and actually belies, the court’s speculative assertion that the phone was searched before Miranda warnings were administered, because the video shows that, when the detective eventually brought the phone into the interview room and obtained defendant’s consent to look at some of its features, defendant had to unlock the phone with either a password or swiping pattern. People v Moore, 2018 NY Slip Op 04042, Third Dept 6-7-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SUPPRESSION, DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPPRESSION, DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPPRESSION, PEOPLE’S APPEAL,  DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (SUPPRESSION, DEFENDANT DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIS CELL PHONE, COUNTY COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING THAT EVIDENCE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (THIRD DEPT))

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