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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Supreme Court should have placed defendant in a judicial diversion program in this cocaine-sale case. Defendant’s need for money to support his marijuana use qualified him for diversion, despite his prior completion of a drug treatment program:

The court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request to participate in the judicial diversion program. The court based this determination on the erroneous ground that defendant had failed to establish that his “substance abuse or dependence [wa]s a contributing factor to [his] criminal behavior” (CPL 216.05[3][b][iii]). “The statute does not require that a defendant’s . . . substance abuse or dependence be the exclusive or primary cause of the defendant’s criminal behavior,” but “only requires that it be a contributing factor” … . In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to selling cocaine to an undercover police officer for $300, and was found carrying that amount in prerecorded buy money, an additional $880 in cash, and three cell phones. Defendant reported that his heavy use of marijuana cost him about $50 to $60 per day. In light of these facts and other particular circumstances of this case, defendant’s need for enough money to fund that habit evidently contributed to his criminal behavior of selling cocaine.

Accordingly, the court should order judicial diversion pursuant to CPL article 216, giving due recognition to the drug treatment program defendant has already completed. This result is consistent with one of the purposes of judicial diversion, which is to permit a defendant to achieve a disposition other than a felony conviction, where appropriate. People v Alston, 2018 NY Slip Op 03324, First Dept 5-8-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DIVERSION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))/JUDICIAL DIVERSION (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))/DIVERSION (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))/SENTENCING (JUDICIAL DIVERSION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PLACED DEFENDANT IN A JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THIS COCAINE-SALE CASE, CRITERIA AND PURPOSE EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT))

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