You are here: / / Continuous Treatment Doctrine (Tolling the Statute of Limitations) Explained...
, ,

Continuous Treatment Doctrine (Tolling the Statute of Limitations) Explained In Depth

The First Department, over a dissent, determined that the jury’s conclusion the statute of limitations was tolled under the continuous treatment doctrine should not be disturbed.  Plaintiff underwent Lasik surgery and complained of blurry vision and other complications in several follow up visits which ended in 2004.  Plaintiff commenced the lawsuit after a subsequent visit in 2007.  The question was whether the 2007 visit was related to the 2004 visits such that the continuous treatment doctrine applied.  The court discussed the doctrine in depth.  The court noted that the doctrine did not apply to plaintiff-wife’s derivative claims:

Plaintiff … asserts that the 2007 visit satisfied CPLR 214-a, because it was for the “same” condition as the 2004 visits, which was blurry vision in his left eye. He further argues that whether he and defendant agreed that he would seek further treatment after the May 2004 visit is irrelevant, because defendant “guaranteed” that the Lasik procedure would correct the blurry condition, and stated that he was plaintiff’s “doctor for life” for that purpose.

Although the CPLR defines “continuous” treatment as treatment “for the same illness, injury or condition” out of which the malpractice arose (CPLR 214-a [emphasis added]), the controlling case law holds only that the subsequent medical visits must “relate” to the original condition … . Here, plaintiff initially engaged defendant to correct his blurry vision, and the 2007 visit was motivated by continued blurriness in plaintiff’s eye, thus making the two visits “related” … . Devadas v Niksarli, 2014 NY Slip Op 06032, 1st Dept 9-4-14

 

You might also like
REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT).
CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WOULD NOT BE ENFORCED BECAUSE THE CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT MAY DEPRIVE CHILDREN OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUPPORT.
THE DEFENSE REQUEST FOR THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL-EVIDENCE JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
PUBLICITY AGENT FOR A BROADWAY SHOW BREACHED THE COVENENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY SENDING EMAILS TO AN INVESTOR DESIGNED TO SINK THE PRODUCTION.
ALTHOUGH THE BOOM TRUCK WAS 700 FEET FROM WHERE IT WAS LOADED WHEN THE BOOM STRUCK AN OVERHEAD SIGN, THE TRUCK WAS AT THE WORK SITE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LABOR LAW, ALTHOUGH THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION ADDRESSED THE POSITION OF THE BOOM BUT NOT THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT, THE PROVISION WAS BROADLY WORDED AND RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION 1ST DEPT.
ELEVATED PLATFORM NOT A DANGEROUS CONDITION AS A MATTER OF LAW.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE NEGLIGENT OR TO HAVE EXERCISED SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER THE INJURY-PRODUCING WORK; SCHEDULING AND COORDINATING WORK DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUPERVISON AND CONTROL; THE COMMON-LAW INDEMNIFICATION AND CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF ON A SUBWAY FOR A TRANSIT VIOLATION, THE CONCURRENCE CALLED INTO QUESTION THE ‘TRANSIT DATABASE’ WHICH PROBABLY INCLUDES PERSONS WHOSE CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE SEALED AND DISMISSED, THE DATABASE DOES NOT PROVIDE A DISTINCT BASIS FOR ARREST (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Hearsay Deemed Insufficient to Support Determination One Year Statute of Limitations in Labor Law 740 Trumps the One-Year-Ninety-Days...