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Continuous Treatment Doctrine (Tolling the Statute of Limitations) Explained In Depth

The First Department, over a dissent, determined that the jury’s conclusion the statute of limitations was tolled under the continuous treatment doctrine should not be disturbed.  Plaintiff underwent Lasik surgery and complained of blurry vision and other complications in several follow up visits which ended in 2004.  Plaintiff commenced the lawsuit after a subsequent visit in 2007.  The question was whether the 2007 visit was related to the 2004 visits such that the continuous treatment doctrine applied.  The court discussed the doctrine in depth.  The court noted that the doctrine did not apply to plaintiff-wife’s derivative claims:

Plaintiff … asserts that the 2007 visit satisfied CPLR 214-a, because it was for the “same” condition as the 2004 visits, which was blurry vision in his left eye. He further argues that whether he and defendant agreed that he would seek further treatment after the May 2004 visit is irrelevant, because defendant “guaranteed” that the Lasik procedure would correct the blurry condition, and stated that he was plaintiff’s “doctor for life” for that purpose.

Although the CPLR defines “continuous” treatment as treatment “for the same illness, injury or condition” out of which the malpractice arose (CPLR 214-a [emphasis added]), the controlling case law holds only that the subsequent medical visits must “relate” to the original condition … . Here, plaintiff initially engaged defendant to correct his blurry vision, and the 2007 visit was motivated by continued blurriness in plaintiff’s eye, thus making the two visits “related” … . Devadas v Niksarli, 2014 NY Slip Op 06032, 1st Dept 9-4-14

 

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