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PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT RENDERED THE ROBBERY INDICTMENT COUNT DUPLICITOUS BY SUGGESTING THE COUNT COULD APPLY TO THE THEFT OF A BICYCLE WHICH WAS NOT CHARGED IN THAT COUNT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the prosecutor’s closing argument rendered an indictment count duplicitous by suggesting the robbery count could apply to either a cell phone or a bicycle (different victims). The indictment count charged robbery of the cell phone:

The indictment, as amplified by the bill of particulars, charged defendant in the first count with robbery in the second degree, for forcibly stealing one victim’s cell phone, and in the second count with criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, for possession of a bicycle, stolen from another victim, on which defendant attempted to flee the scene. In summation, the prosecutor repeatedly argued — in apparent response to defense counsel’s argument that the evidence showed that defendant abandoned the phone before striking one of his pursuers, and therefore that a robbery could not be established — that even if the court did not find that defendant used force to retain the phone, it could still find that he used force to retain the bicycle. Defense counsel objected to these arguments and the court overruled them.

We find that these arguments rendered the first count duplicitous by newly alleging that defendant was guilty under the first count if he forcibly stole either the phone or the bicycle (see CPL 200.30[1]). The lesser included offense of petit larceny, of which defendant was ultimately convicted, suffered from the same infirmity. People v Perez, 2018 NY Slip Op 01416, First Dept 3-1-18

CRIMINAL LAW (PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT RENDERED THE ROBBERY INDICTMENT COUNT DUPLICITOUS BY SUGGESTING THE COUNT COULD APPLY TO THE THEFT OF A BICYCLE WHICH WAS NOT CHARGED IN THAT COUNT (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT RENDERED THE ROBBERY INDICTMENT COUNT DUPLICITOUS BY SUGGESTING THE COUNT COULD APPLY TO THE THEFT OF A BICYCLE WHICH WAS NOT CHARGED IN THAT COUNT (FIRST DEPT))/INDICTMENTS (DUPLICITOUS, PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT RENDERED THE ROBBERY INDICTMENT COUNT DUPLICITOUS BY SUGGESTING THE COUNT COULD APPLY TO THE THEFT OF A BICYCLE WHICH WAS NOT CHARGED IN THAT COUNT (FIRST DEPT))/DUPLICITY (CRIMINAL LAW, INDICTMENTS, PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT RENDERED THE ROBBERY INDICTMENT COUNT DUPLICITOUS BY SUGGESTING THE COUNT COULD APPLY TO THE THEFT OF A BICYCLE WHICH WAS NOT CHARGED IN THAT COUNT (FIRST DEPT))

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