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BECAUSE NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROVIDED BY A SELF-INSURER ARE A CREATURE STATUTE, NOT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, THE THREE-YEAR (NOT SIX-YEAR) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO NO-FAULT CLAIMS AGAINST A SELF-INSURER (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a concurrence and a three-judge dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the three-year statute of limitations applies to no-fault claims against a self-insurer. The court reasoned that the self-insurance option is a creature of statute, not a contract:

We conclude that the three-year statute of limitations as set forth in CPLR 214 (2), which governs disputes with respect to penalties created by statute, should control this case. There is no dispute “that it is the gravamen or essence of the cause of action that determines the applicable Statute of Limitations” … , or that a three-year limitations period applies to “an action to recover upon a liability. . . created or imposed by statute” … . Moreover, although the three-year period of limitation in “CPLR 214 (2) does not automatically apply to all causes of action in which a statutory remedy is sought” … , that condition does attach to instances in which “liability would not exist but for a statute” (id.).

The no-fault benefits in dispute are not provided by a contract with a private insurer. Instead defendant has met its statutory obligation by self-insuring. No-fault is a creature of statute … . Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 03093, CtApp 5-1-18

​INSURANCE LAW (NO-FAULT, BECAUSE NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROVIDED BY A SELF-INSURER ARE A CREATURE STATUTE, NOT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, THE THREE-YEAR (NOT SIX-YEAR) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO NO-FAULT CLAIMS AGAINST A SELF-INSURER (CT APP))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (INSURANCE LAW, NO-FAULT, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BECAUSE NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROVIDED BY A SELF-INSURER ARE A CREATURE STATUTE, NOT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, THE THREE-YEAR (NOT SIX-YEAR) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO NO-FAULT CLAIMS AGAINST A SELF-INSURER (CT APP))/CPLR 214 (INSURANCE LAW, NO-FAULT, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BECAUSE NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROVIDED BY A SELF-INSURER ARE A CREATURE STATUTE, NOT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, THE THREE-YEAR (NOT SIX-YEAR) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO NO-FAULT CLAIMS AGAINST A SELF-INSURER (CT APP))/NO-FAULT (BECAUSE NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROVIDED BY A SELF-INSURER ARE A CREATURE STATUTE, NOT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, THE THREE-YEAR (NOT SIX-YEAR) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO NO-FAULT CLAIMS AGAINST A SELF-INSURER (CT APP))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  (INSURANCE LAW, NO-FAULT, BECAUSE NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROVIDED BY A SELF-INSURER ARE A CREATURE STATUTE, NOT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, THE THREE-YEAR (NOT SIX-YEAR) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO NO-FAULT CLAIMS AGAINST A SELF-INSURER (CT APP))/SELF-INSURER  (INSURANCE LAW, NO-FAULT, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BECAUSE NO-FAULT BENEFITS PROVIDED BY A SELF-INSURER ARE A CREATURE STATUTE, NOT AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, THE THREE-YEAR (NOT SIX-YEAR) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO NO-FAULT CLAIMS AGAINST A SELF-INSURER (CT APP))

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