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THE EXTENSION (NOW TO 2026) OF THE TIME FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE 9-11 CLEANUP TO FILE CLAIMS FOR MEDICAL BENEFITS DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS FOR DEATH BENEFITS BY A BENEFICIARY OF A DECEASED PARTICIPANT; HERE THE PARTICIPANT’S WIFE MADE A CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS WHICH WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE THE STATUTORY DEADLINE IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW SECTION 28 HAD PASSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined the two-year death-benefit statute of limitations in Workers’ Compensation Law section 28 precluded a claim for death benefits made by the wife of a volunteer who participated in the 9-11 cleanup and who had received lifetime benefits for resulting medical conditions. Although the deadline for claims for medical benefits has been extended (to 2026), that extension does not apply to claims for death benefits by surviving beneficiaries:

[Workers’ Compensation Law 168] explicitly refers to “[a] claim by a participant,” permits such participant’s claim to be filed within the enumerated extended time period, and again repeats “[a]ny such participant” when stating that certain previously denied claims “shall be reconsidered by the board” … . The phrase “claim by a participant” does not encompass claims by the surviving beneficiaries of those individuals. This is made clearer by comparison with the language in Workers’ Compensation Law § 18, which expressly provides that notice may be given by “any person claiming to be entitled to compensation or some one in his behalf” and can be “signed by [the employee] or by a person on his behalf or, in case of death, by any one or more of his dependents, or by a person, on their behalf.” Likewise, Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 refers to “the claimant” and references payments “to an employee or his dependents in case of death.” Workers’ Compensation Law § 168’s use of the phrase “[a] claim by a participant” must therefore be understood to mean that only a claim brought by a participant, and not by the survivors or beneficiaries of a participant, may benefit from the extended time limits of Workers’ Compensation Law § 168. As the Appellate Division reasoned, “it was decedent who was entitled to file a claim for benefits outside of the period allowed by Workers’ Compensation Law § 28” … .

No other provision provides claimant with relief from the requirement that claims be filed within the two-year limitations period. Matter of Garcia v WTC Volunteer, 2025 NY Slip Op 06360, CtApp 11-20-25

Practice Point: Claims for death benefits by the beneficiaries of deceased participants in the 9-11 cleanup are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in Workers’ Compensation Law.

 

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