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COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint stated a cause of action to quiet title:

“To maintain a cause of action to quiet title [to real property], a plaintiff must allege actual or constructive possession of the property and the existence of a removable cloud on the property, which is an apparent title to the property, such as in a deed or other instrument, that is actually invalid or inoperative” … . …

Here, the complaint alleged, in relevant part, that the plaintiff acquired title to the subject property pursuant to a deed dated September 10, 2008, from nonparty Joon Asset Mgmt. Corp. (hereinafter Joon). The complaint also alleged that the plaintiff is in possession of the property and that there exists a removable cloud on the property in the form of a deed dated January 7, 2008, and recorded November 6, 2008, purporting to convey title to the property from Joon to the defendant Edna Rios. The complaint further alleged that the deed to Rios was invalid and part of a fraudulent scheme, and that Rios’s role in the scheme was that of a “straw buyer.” The complaint sought to adjudge the deed dated January 7, 2008, to be a fraudulent deed, the plaintiff to be the holder of an undivided fee interest in the premises pursuant to the deed dated September 10, 2008, and Rios to be barred from all claims to any estate or interest in the premises.

Accepting these allegations as true, the complaint pleads a viable cause of action to quiet title … . Nurse v Rios, 2018 NY Slip Op 02640, Second Dept 4-18-18

​REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (QUIET TITLE, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/QUIET TITLE (REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/DEEDS (QUIET TITLE, REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/FRAUD (QUIET TITLE, REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

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