You are here: / / CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH...
, , ,

CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined several distinct issues (not all summarized here) that arose from a lawsuit alleging the defendant doctors and hospital performed a c-section birth against plaintiff’s wishes. The cause of action based upon defendants’ performing an unwanted procedure alleged an intentional tort and, based upon the one-year statute of limitations, was untimely. The Public Health Law cause of action was not appropriate because those statutes and regulations do not apply to hospitals (as opposed to residential health care facilities):

… [I]t is clear from the statutory scheme that Public Health Law § 2803-c was not intended to apply to hospitals.

Public Health Law § 2801-d authorizes a private right of action by patients of “residential health care facilities” for the violation of rights enumerated in Public Health Law § 2803-c. “Residential health care facility” is defined by the statute as “a nursing home or facility providing health-related service” (Public Health Law § 2801[3]). Since the hospital is not a “residential health care facility,” this provision is not applicable to the hospital … . The fact that the legislature did not specify that a private right of action was available against hospitals indicates that providing a private right of action to hospital patients was contrary to the legislative scheme. Therefore, no private right of action under the Public Health Law should be inferred … . Dray v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 2018 NY Slip Op 02314, Second Dept 4-4-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))/INTENTIONAL TORTS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))/PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))/HOSPITALS (PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
Single-Family House Exemption to Labor Law Action Applied
Procedure for Sentencing a Second Felony Offender Not Followed
Defendant Failed to Demonstrate the Cause of Plaintiff’s Fall (a Ramp Outside a Building) Was Open and Obvious as a Matter of Law—Summary Judgment Should Not Have Been Granted
THE TRUST-ASSET-SUBSTITUTION AGREEMENT, SUBSTITUTING LIFE INSURANCE FOR CERTAIN ASSETS, WAS SUBJECT TO EPTL 11-1.7(a)(1); THEREFORE THE PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT RELEASING THE TRUSTEE FROM LIABILITY WAS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND THE TRUSTEE IS LIABLE FOR FAILING TO ENSURE THE LIFE INSURANCE PREMIUMS WERE PAID (SECOND DEPT).
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST PROPERLY IMPOSED UPON THE PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE TO COVER CHILD SUPPORT AND EDUCATION COSTS.
CORRIDOR FORMED BY LUMBER AND MATERIALS PILED ON EITHER SIDE WAS A PASSAGEWAY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, DEFENDANT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 241 (6).
FILING A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION CONSTITUTED TAKING PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).
PARTY IS DEEMED TO HAVE READ A SIGNED DOCUMENT, JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE ON THIS CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE PROPERLY GRANTED, BANKING LAW REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DISTRIBUTING A LETTER WHICH DEALT WITH RELIGIOUS (NATION OF ISLAM) INFORMATION... PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NONLEGAL REPRESENTATIVE TO A DEFENSE PHYSICAL...