You are here: / / CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH...
, , ,

CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined several distinct issues (not all summarized here) that arose from a lawsuit alleging the defendant doctors and hospital performed a c-section birth against plaintiff’s wishes. The cause of action based upon defendants’ performing an unwanted procedure alleged an intentional tort and, based upon the one-year statute of limitations, was untimely. The Public Health Law cause of action was not appropriate because those statutes and regulations do not apply to hospitals (as opposed to residential health care facilities):

… [I]t is clear from the statutory scheme that Public Health Law § 2803-c was not intended to apply to hospitals.

Public Health Law § 2801-d authorizes a private right of action by patients of “residential health care facilities” for the violation of rights enumerated in Public Health Law § 2803-c. “Residential health care facility” is defined by the statute as “a nursing home or facility providing health-related service” (Public Health Law § 2801[3]). Since the hospital is not a “residential health care facility,” this provision is not applicable to the hospital … . The fact that the legislature did not specify that a private right of action was available against hospitals indicates that providing a private right of action to hospital patients was contrary to the legislative scheme. Therefore, no private right of action under the Public Health Law should be inferred … . Dray v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 2018 NY Slip Op 02314, Second Dept 4-4-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))/INTENTIONAL TORTS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN UNWANTED C-SECTION BIRTH STATES AN INTENTIONAL TORT SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))/PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))/HOSPITALS (PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST HOSPITALS (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE J.H.O./REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY CPLR 3104 OR ANY ORDER ISSUED BY THE COURT TO CONSIDER AN ALLEGED DEFICIENCY IN THE AMENDED BILL OF PARTICULARS; THE ISSUE PRESENTED A QUESTION OF LAW WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BELOW, THEREFORE IT MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL; ORDER STRIKING THE COMPLAINT VACATED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT DOCTOR WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED TO TESTIFY ABOUT HIS USUAL PRACTICE OR HABIT IN PERFORMING KNEE REPLACEMENT SURGERY (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK DID NOT PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE-OF-FORECLOSURE MAILING REQUIREMENTS; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERED WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AFFORDED YOUTHUL OFFENDER STATUS; SENTENCE VACATED (SECOND DEPT). ​
PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE DEFENSE WITH INFORMATION ABOUT FAVORABLE TREATMENT AFFORDED A WITNESS IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS TESTIMONY, AND THE PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO CORRECT THE WITNESS’S MISLEADING TESTIMONY, REQUIRED REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A HOME TO RETRIEVE A HANDGUN DEFENDANT HAD THROWN UNDER A CHAIR IN THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER ANY EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT, THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE OFFICER DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE DEFENDANT HAD THROWN UNDER THE CHAIR, THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN THE OFFICER REENTERED THE HOME TO LOOK UNDER THE CHAIR (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS THE PRODUCT OF SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO “REINSTATE” A PRIOR VERDICT THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE JUDGE.
PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE GRAND JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF COMMON OWNERSHIP REQUIRED REVERSAL AND DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2023 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DISTRIBUTING A LETTER WHICH DEALT WITH RELIGIOUS (NATION OF ISLAM) INFORMATION... PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NONLEGAL REPRESENTATIVE TO A DEFENSE PHYSICAL...