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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN A WORK AREA ON THE 16TH FLOOR USED FOR RENOVATION WORK ON THE 41ST FLOOR, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE 16TH FLOOR WAS A CONSTRUCTION AREA WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6), THE COURT NOTED A LESSEE IS AN OWNER WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 241 (6) action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff worked for a company hired to renovate building space leased by defendant (Cayre). Cayre’s space was on the 41st and 42nd floors. The space where plaintiff was injured was on the 16th floor in an area used by plaintiff’s employer for work related to the renovation of Cayre’s space. Plaintiff’s thumb was injured when he was using an unguarded saw on the 16th floor. The court noted that a lessee is deemed an owner within the meaning of Labor Law 241 (6):

We find that there are disputed issues of fact concerning whether the 16th floor space qualifies as a construction area. … . …”[G]enerally, the scope of a work site must be reviewed as a flexible concept, defined not only by the place but by the circumstances of the work to be done. Thus, Labor Law § 241(6) extends to areas where materials or equipment are being readied for use, as opposed to areas where they are merely stored for future use” … . Here, although defendants contend that the 16th floor space is [plaintiff’s employer’s] permanent workshop, in fact, the 16th floor work space where the accident occurred belonged to 1407 Broadway [the net operating lessee], and the 41st floor location of the executive bathroom being renovated was owned by 1407 Broadway, and leased to Cayre. * * *

We … reject Cayre’s argument that … plaintiff’s accident does not come within the ambit of Labor Law § 241(6) because he was engaged in the fabrication and transportation of materials to be used in connection with construction. As stated by the Court of Appeals, Labor Law § 241(6) covers industrial accidents that occur in the context of construction (Nagel v D & R Realty Corp., 99 NY2d 98). Indeed, Shields v General Elec. Co. (3 AD3d 715 [3d Dept 2004]) is instructive. There, the Court noted that “work that is an integral part of the construction contract’ and is necessitated by and incidental to the construction . . . and involve[s] materials being readied for use in connection therewith’ is construction work” … . Karwowski v 1407 Broadway Real Estate, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 01422, First Dept 3-2-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN A WORK AREA ON THE 16TH FLOOR USED FOR RENOVATION WORK ON THE 41ST FLOOR, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE 16TH FLOOR WAS A CONSTRUCTION AREA WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6), THE COURT NOTED A LESSEE IS AN OWNER WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6) (FIRST DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN A WORK AREA ON THE 16TH FLOOR USED FOR RENOVATION WORK ON THE 41ST FLOOR, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE 16TH FLOOR WAS A CONSTRUCTION AREA WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6), THE COURT NOTED A LESSEE IS AN OWNER WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6) (FIRST DEPT))/CONSTRUCTION AREA (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN A WORK AREA ON THE 16TH FLOOR USED FOR RENOVATION WORK ON THE 41ST FLOOR, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE 16TH FLOOR WAS A CONSTRUCTION AREA WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6), THE COURT NOTED A LESSEE IS AN OWNER WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6) (FIRST DEPT))

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