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SUPREME COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED A RELEASE WHICH DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS REVERSED ON APPEAL AND SENT BACK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Supreme Court properly considered a release that defendant had signed after the matter had been reversed on appeal and before the case was heard on remittal:

While Supreme Court is powerless to change a remittitur from this Court, “nevertheless, in order to avoid an obviously unjust result it may mold its procedure and adapt its relief to the exigencies of any new facts or conditions which were not before the [appellate court] when it made its original determination and entered its remittitur”… . Here, the release is a “new fact” that was not considered by this Court, and Supreme Court properly determined that it would be unjust to ignore its existence and proceed with the litigation. Gramercy Park Residence Corp. v Ellman, 2018 NY Slip Op 04424, First Dept 6-14-18

APPEALS SUPREME (COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED A RELEASE WHICH DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS REVERSED ON APPEAL AND SENT BACK (FIRST DEPT))/REMITTITUR (APPEALS, COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED A RELEASE WHICH DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME THE CASE WAS REVERSED ON APPEAL AND SENT BACK (FIRST DEPT))

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NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION... WHETHER TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE IS A STRATEGIC DECISION FOR DEFENSE...