You are here: / / QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE OWNER OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER AND...
,

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE OWNER OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY HIRED BY THE SHELTER WERE LIABLE FOR THE SHOOTING OF A CHILD JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE OF THE SHELTER, THE CHILD WAS AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, affirmed the denial of the defendants' motions for summary judgment in this third party assault case. The defendants are the owner-operators of a domestic violence shelter and the security company hired by the shelter. Plaintiff child, CB, was shot while CB and his father, Bobby B, were waiting for CB's mother to come down to the gate to accompany CB back to where she and CB were residing in the shelter. Bobby B had asked the guards to let the child in because Bobby B had been followed by several men. The child was not let in. The guards called CB's mother a couple of times telling her the child was waiting. One of the men who followed Bobby B approached with a gun and demanded Bobby B's jacket. In a struggle the gun discharged striking and paralyzing CB:

With respect to the common-law duty, landowners have “a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining [their] . . . property in a reasonably safe condition under the circumstances”…, which includes taking minimal safety precautions to protect against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third persons … .

We reject defendants' contention that they had no common-law duty to CB because the shooting took place outside the building, i.e., because CB was on the street side of the gate. Plaintiffs raised issues of fact as to whether the security booth, gate, and recessed area that CB was standing in were part of the shelter property and not the public sidewalk. However, even if CB was not standing on shelter property, it cannot be said that under any circumstance [the owner] owed no duty to him. …

​

Although the contract [with defendant security company] clearly provides that CB is an intended third-party beneficiary, there are issues of fact as to the benefits that CB is entitled to under the contract. It should be noted, however, that allowing a child in danger to enter the shelter does not appear to be in derogation of any rules prohibiting unarmed guards from intervening in an altercation. CB v Howard Sec., 2018 NY Slip Op 00087, First Dept 1-4-18

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE OWNER OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY HIRED BY THE SHELTER WERE LIABLE FOR THE SHOOTING OF A CHILD JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE OF THE SHELTER, THE CHILD WAS AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY (FIRST DEPT))/ASSAULT BY THIRD PARTY (NEGLIGENCE, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE OWNER OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY HIRED BY THE SHELTER WERE LIABLE FOR THE SHOOTING OF A CHILD JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE OF THE SHELTER, THE CHILD WAS AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT, SECURITY COMPANY, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE OWNER OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY HIRED BY THE SHELTER WERE LIABLE FOR THE SHOOTING OF A CHILD JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE OF THE SHELTER, THE CHILD WAS AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY (FIRST DEPT))/THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY (CONTRACT LAW, SECURITY COMPANY, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE OWNER OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY HIRED BY THE SHELTER WERE LIABLE FOR THE SHOOTING OF A CHILD JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE OF THE SHELTER, THE CHILD WAS AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE SHELTER AND THE SECURITY COMPANY (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISQUALIFY A JUROR WHO SAID SHE COULD NOT CONTINUE DELIBERATING BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM THE CASE.
Checkpoint Vehicle Stop Illegal
THE DIRECT BENEFITS THEORY OF ESTOPPEL WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFF, A NONSIGNATORY TO THE AGREEMENT WITH THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE; THE PLAINTIFF, THERFORE, COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE (FIRST DEPT).
HEARSAY OFFERED IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY CONSIDERED.
FAMILY COURT HAS THE DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A CHILD’S PLACEMENT IN A QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAM (QRTP) AT EVERY PERMANENCY HEARING (FIRST DEPT).
NEW YORK LABOR LAW WORK-PAY REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO WORK DONE OUT-OF-STATE (FIRST DEPT).
A SUBPOENA ISSUED BY AN ATTORNEY IS A “JUDICIAL” SUBPOENA SUBJECT TO A CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WITHOUT THE NEED TO FIRST SEEK A COURT ORDER COMPELLING COMPLIANCE (FIRST DEPT).
CLAIMANT FELL OFF AN I-BEAM AND HIS LANYARD DID NOT PREVENT HIM FROM STRIKING THE DECK EIGHT TO TEN FEET BELOW; CLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER BUS COMPANY LIABLE FOR... SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTORS NOT LIABLE FOR PARKING LOT SLIP AND FALL, ESPINAL EXCEPTIONS...