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REINSURANCE POLICIES TO BE INTERPRETED USING STANDARD CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OR RULE OF CONSTRUCTION CONCERNING WHETHER A COVERAGE CAP INCLUDES ONLY LOSS, OR INCLUDES BOTH LOSS AND LITIGATION COSTS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, answered a question from the Second Circuit about how to interpret reinsurance policies. The Court of Appeals held that a 2004 decision by that court did not impose a presumption or rule of construction to be applied to reinsurance policies. Rather each reinsurance policy is to be interpreted using standard contract principles. The underlying issue in the case is whether the cap in a reinsurance policy was limited to the amount of loss, or whether the cap included litigation costs. The opinion includes a clear explanation of the two types of reinsurance policies (not summarized here):

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… New York law does not impose either a rule, or a presumption, that a limitation on liability clause necessarily caps all obligations owed by a reinsurer, such as defense costs, without regard for the specific language employed therein. Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v Century Indem. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 08711, CtApp 12-14-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (REINSURANCE POLICIES TO BE INTERPRETED USING STANDARD CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OR RULE OF CONSTRUCTION CONCERNING WHETHER A COVERAGE CAP INCLUDES ONLY LOSS, OR INCLUDES BOTH LOSS AND LITIGATION COSTS (CT APP))/REINSURANCE (REINSURANCE POLICIES TO BE INTERPRETED USING STANDARD CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OR RULE OF CONSTRUCTION CONCERNING WHETHER A COVERAGE CAP INCLUDES ONLY LOSS, OR INCLUDES BOTH LOSS AND LITIGATION COSTS (CT APP))

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