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COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE INCARCERATION FOR VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF A CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, DEFENDANT HAD COMPLETED HIS ONE YEAR DEFINITE SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION FOR FELONY DWI AND WAS IN THE CONSECUTIVE PERIOD OF CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE WHEN HE DROVE WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Aarons, reversing County Court, determined defendant, who had completed his one-year definite sentence for felony DWI, could not be sentenced to further incarceration for violating the terms of the conditional discharge by driving without an ignition interlock device:

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Defendant served the one-year jail term and … served it first. …[D]efendant did not serve part of his one-year sentence; rather, he completed the entirety of that definite sentence. Because of the statutory command of Penal Law § 60.21, the conditional discharge period had to run consecutively to the period of incarceration and, therefore, commenced upon his release from jail. It was during the time following defendant’s completion of the one-year definite sentence that he admittedly operated a vehicle without an ignition interlock device and violated the terms of the conditional discharge. The statutory framework governing sentencing does not cover these factual circumstances. The enactment of Penal Law § 60.21 spawned the type of sentence that was imposed upon defendant in 2013 for his DWI conviction — i.e., a definite term of incarceration with a period of conditional discharge to run consecutively. There were, however, no corresponding statutes or amendments to already existing statutes that delineated the type of sanctions that courts could impose in a case such as this one. * * *

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“A defendant must be sentenced according to the law as it existed at the time that he or she committed the offense”…  and, at the time defendant operated a vehicle without an ignition interlock device, the applicable law did not allow for the imposition of an additional period of imprisonment as done by County Court and as advocated by the People. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence of 2 to 6 years followed by three years of conditional discharge must be vacated. People v Coon, 2017 NY Slip Op 08216, Third Dept 11-22-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE INCARCERATION FOR VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF A CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, DEFENDANT HAD COMPLETED HIS ONE YEAR DEFINITE SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION FOR FELONY DWI AND WAS IN THE CONSECUTIVE PERIOD OF CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE WHEN HE DROVE WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE (THIRD DEPT))/SENTENCING (CRIMINAL LAW, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE INCARCERATION FOR VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF A CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, DEFENDANT HAD COMPLETED HIS ONE YEAR DEFINITE SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION FOR FELONY DWI AND WAS IN THE CONSECUTIVE PERIOD OF CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE WHEN HE DROVE WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE (THIRD DEPT))/CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE (CRIMINAL LAW, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE INCARCERATION FOR VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF A CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, DEFENDANT HAD COMPLETED HIS ONE YEAR DEFINITE SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION FOR FELONY DWI AND WAS IN THE CONSECUTIVE PERIOD OF CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE WHEN HE DROVE WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE (THIRD DEPT))

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