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IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR FRYE HEARINGS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF FRYE HEARINGS IN OTHER COURTS OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION CONCERNING LCN AND FST DNA TESTING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that the trial court’s denial of a Frye hearing about DNA testing was properly denied based upon the results of an eight-month long Frye hearing on the same issues in a court of coordinate jurisdiction:

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The motion court’s pretrial ruling … denying defendant’s motion to exclude, or alternatively to conduct a Frye … hearing on, expert testimony relating to high sensitivity, or low copy number (LCN) DNA testing, was a provident exercise of discretion. At the time that the motion court’s ruling was made, a court of coordinate jurisdiction, following an eight-month Frye hearing, had issued a decision holding that LCN DNA testing was “generally accepted as reliable in the forensic scientific community” and “not a novel scientific procedure” … . “A court need not hold a Frye hearing where it can rely upon previous rulings in other court proceedings as an aid in determining the admissibility of the proffered testimony” … . …

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Likewise, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s renewed motion for a Frye hearing … , which motion was recast to include evidence relating to both LCN DNA testing and a then-recently issued FST DNA testing report, was a provident exercise of discretion. The trial court’s ruling was consistent with prior determinations of courts of coordinate jurisdiction that these procedures were not novel scientific techniques and were generally accepted by the relevant scientific community … . People v Gonzalez, 2017 NY Slip Op 08191, First Dept 11-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, FRYE HEARINGS, DNA TESTING, IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR FRYE HEARINGS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF FRYE HEARINGS IN OTHER COURTS OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION CONCERNING LCN AND FST DNA TESTING (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, FRYE HEARINGS, DNA TESTING, IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR FRYE HEARINGS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF FRYE HEARINGS IN OTHER COURTS OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION CONCERNING LCN AND FST DNA TESTING (FIRST DEPT))/FRYE HEARINGS (CRIMINAL LAW DNA TESTING, IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR FRYE HEARINGS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF FRYE HEARINGS IN OTHER COURTS OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION CONCERNING LCN AND FST DNA TESTING (FIRST DEPT))/DNA (CRIMINAL LAW, FRYE HEARINGS, IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR FRYE HEARINGS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF FRYE HEARINGS IN OTHER COURTS OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION CONCERNING LCN AND FST DNA TESTING (FIRST DEPT))

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