You are here: / / MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD...
, ,

MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED, INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (in part) Supreme Court, determined one of defendant’s motions for a directed verdict was premature because plaintiff had not finished presenting proof, a second motion for a directed verdict was properly granted based upon admissions made by plaintiff’s witness, and a cross-claim based upon an indemnification agreement failed because the agreement purported to indemnify a party for its own negligence (in violation of the General Obligations Law). With respect to the premature motion for a directed verdict, the court wrote:

​

“Any party may move for judgment with respect to a cause of action or issue upon the ground that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such cause of action or issue, or at any time on the basis of admissions.”

In interpreting this provision, this Court has held that the requirement that a party opposing a directed verdict motion must have closed its presentation of evidence “must be strictly enforced” (Griffin v Clinton Green S., LLC, 98 AD3d 41, 46 [1st Dept 2012]). Further, we have held that “the grant of a dismissal [pursuant to CPLR 4401] prior to the close of the opposing party’s case will be reversed as premature, even if the ultimate success of the opposing party in the action is improbable” … . This Court in Griffin emphasized the importance of each party being “afford[ed] . . . a day in court” … . * * *

​

[Defendant] essentially asks us to endorse a system whereby a party can make a directed verdict motion at any time during trial, so long as the party opposing the motion has put in some unspecified quantum of evidence that, though it may not have been everything the opposing party intended to put in, was sufficient for the trial court to determine that there were no issues of fact and it could decide for the movant as a matter of law. We decline to do so. 11 Essex St. Corp. v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2017 NY Slip Op 06709, First Dept 9-28-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/DIRECTED VERDICT, MOTION FOR  (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))CONTRACT LAW (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT  (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE  (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
Checkpoint Vehicle Stop Illegal
FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE PERIOD OF POST RELEASE SUPERVISION REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE; PRESERVATION OF THE ERROR NOT NECESSARY (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ARRAIGNED ON A SPECIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING A PRIOR CONVICTION PRIOR TO JURY SELECTION, THE STATUTE REQUIRES ARRAIGNMENT AFTER JURY SELECTION, THE ERROR WAS DEEMED HARMLESS HOWEVER (FIRST DEPT).
DESPITE THE INITIAL FRAUDULENT TRANSFER OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY AND THE ABSENCE OF THE NOTE, PLAINTIFF LENDER COULD FORECLOSE AS THE UNDISPUTED HOLDER OF THE NOTE, THE INITIAL FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED DEED WAS VOIDABLE, NOT VOID (FIRST DEPT).
CASE REMITTED FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GUARANTY LAW WHICH WAS FOUND TO HAVE BARRED PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR CERTAIN AMOUNTS (FIRST DEPT).
VIOLATION OF PROBATION DETERMINATION CANNOT BE BASED SOLELY ON GRAND JURY MINUTES, WHICH CONSTITUTE HEARSAY, PROBATION REINSTATED (FIRST DEPT).
PLANKS AND CRIBBING COVERING AN OPENING WERE SAFETY DEVICES WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1), FAILURE TO SECURE THE CRIBBING WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (FIRST DEPT).
A Counteroffer Extinguishes the Initial Offer Which Cannot Be Unilaterally Revived by Subsequent Acceptance

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS READY WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE... RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT NOT INDEPENDENTLY ASSESSED BY HEARING...