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42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant’s 42 USC 1983 cause of action, as well as the malicious prosecution cause of action, should not have been dismissed. The court noted that the notice of claim need not name any individual police officers who are subsequently sued (acknowledging a split of authority on the issue). The court also explained the statutes of limitations as they apply to false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and 42 USC 1983 causes of action:

The complaint alleged that the defendants arrested, detained, and prosecuted the plaintiff without probable cause and that they knew that the criminal complaint contained falsehoods. The eyewitness’s affidavit … supported these allegations by asserting that police and an ADA coerced the eyewitness to make a false identification of the plaintiff. …

Further, … the eyewitness’s affidavit did not present feigned issues of fact. The eyewitness did not give any prior testimony in this action … . … [H]is affidavit did not contradict the plaintiff’s prior testimony, including the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the eyewitness was “scared” when the police talked to him about the shooting. …

[T]he plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Detective Failla’s evaluation of probable cause was objectively reasonable, thus precluding an award of summary judgment in Detective Failla’s favor on the ground of qualified immunity … .

… [W]e have held that the plain language of General Municipal Law § 50-e(2) does not require a notice of claim to “[list] the names of the individuals who allegedly committed the wrongdoing” … . Williams v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 06477, Second Dept 9-13-17

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/42 USC 1983 (42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/INTENTIONAL TORTS (42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, 42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS NEED NOT BE NAMED IN THE NOTICE OF CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/FALSE ARREST (42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/FALSE IMPRISONMENT (42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (42 USC 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

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