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MISTAKEN COMMENCEMENT DATE IN A LEASE IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RESCISSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a mistaken start-date in the lease was a sufficient ground for rescission:

Rescission “rests upon the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself [or herself] unjustly at the expense of another” … , and is invoked “where the parties can be substantially restored to their status quo ante positions” … . The remedy of rescission may be granted where, as here, a mistake existed at the time the contract was entered into if “the mistake is so material that . . . it goes to the foundation of the agreement”… .

Here, the landlord’s principal admitted at trial that a mistake was made regarding the commencement date of the parties’ lease. Contrary to the landlord’s contention, however, the mistake as to the commencement date related to a material term of the lease … , and substantially defeated the purpose of the lease. K.A.M.M. Group, LLC v 161 Lafayette Realty, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06260, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

LANDLORD-TENANT (LEASE, MISTAKEN COMMENCEMENT DATE IN A LEASE IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RESCISSION (SECOND DEPT))/LEASE (MISTAKEN COMMENCEMENT DATE IN A LEASE IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RESCISSION (SECOND DEPT))/RESCISSION (LEASE, MISTAKEN COMMENCEMENT DATE IN A LEASE IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RESCISSION (SECOND DEPT))

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