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CALIFORNIA STATUTE IS A PROCEDURAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A SUBSTANTIVE STATUTE OF REPOSE, THEREFORE THE STATUTE WOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A NEW YORK ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a California statute was a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose. A statute of limitations, unlike a statute of repose, is considered procedural in New York. Therefore the California statute would not be applied in a New York action. Because the California statute of limitations would not apply to the underlying New York action, the defendant-attorneys’ failure to raise the statute of limitations as a defense did not constitute malpractice:

“In New York, Statutes of Limitation are generally considered procedural because they are [v]iewed as pertaining to the remedy rather than the right” … . A statute of limitations “does not begin to run until a cause of action accrues” … . In contrast, “a statute of repose begins to run when the specified event or events takes place, regardless of whether a potential claim has accrued or, indeed, whether any injury has occurred” … . “The repose period serves as an absolute barrier that prevents a plaintiff’s right of action” … . “In other words, the period of repose has the effect of preventing what might otherwise have been a cause of action from ever arising” … . Statutes of repose “exhibit a substantive texture, nature and consequence that distinguishes them from ordinary limitation provisions” … . … [I]f a statute creates a cause of action and attaches a time limit to its commencement, the time is an ingredient of the cause” … . In contrast, when a cause of action “was cognizable at common law or by other statute law, a statutory time limit is commonly taken as one of limitations and must be asserted by way of defense” … . …

… California Code of Civil Procedure § 366.3 is a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose. Unlike a statute of repose, section 366.3 begins to run at the time the cause of action to recover on the promise to make a testamentary disposition accrues, namely, the date of the promisor’s death … . Nestor v Putney Twombly Hall & Hirson, LLP, 2017 NY Slip Op 06284, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CHOICE OF LAW, CALIFORNIA STATUTE IS A PROCEDURAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A SUBSTANTIVE STATUTE OF REPOSE, THEREFORE THE STATUTE WOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A NEW YORK ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/CHOICE OF LAW ( CALIFORNIA STATUTE IS A PROCEDURAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A SUBSTANTIVE STATUTE OF REPOSE, THEREFORE THE STATUTE WOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A NEW YORK ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  (CHOICE OF LAW, CALIFORNIA STATUTE IS A PROCEDURAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A SUBSTANTIVE STATUTE OF REPOSE, THEREFORE THE STATUTE WOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A NEW YORK ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF REPOSE (CHOICE OF LAW, CALIFORNIA STATUTE IS A PROCEDURAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A SUBSTANTIVE STATUTE OF REPOSE, THEREFORE THE STATUTE WOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A NEW YORK ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

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