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BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. The bank did not demonstrate compliance with statutory notice requirements:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 … . In support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the affidavit of Rodolfo Arias, its vice president of loan documentation, along with a copy of a 90-day notice to the defendants dated May 9, 2010, and Proof of Filing Statements from the New York State Department of Financial Services, demonstrating that the plaintiff filed the information required by RPAPL 1306. Arias stated in his affidavit that the letter dated May 9, 2010, was forwarded to the defendants “by regular and certified mail,” and annexed to his affidavit a copy of the letter. The letter contained a bar code with a 20-digit number below it, but no language indicating that a mailing was done by first-class or certified mail, or even that a mailing was done by the U.S. Postal Service… . While mailing may be proved by documents meeting the requirements of the business records exception to the rule against hearsay, Arias did not make the requisite showing that he was “familiar with the plaintiff’s mailing practices and procedures, and therefore did not establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed” … . The plaintiff’s submission of the Proof of Filing Statements pursuant to RPAPL 1306 was also unavailing. While the statements constituted some proof that a mailing was done, they contained no information indicating that the mailing was done by both registered or certified mail and first-class mail in accordance with RPAPL 1304 … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Lewczuk, 2017 NY Slip Op 06318, Second Dept 8-23-17

FORECLOSURE (BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))

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