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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THAT THE A-FRAME LADDER TOPPLED OVER, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE LADDER WAS AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE AND, IF NOT, WHETHER THE LADDER WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s (Loretta’s) motion for summary judgment in this Labor Law 240 (1) action was properly denied, and the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion to set aside the defense verdict. Apparently plaintiff alleged the A-frame latter toppled over when he was attempting to install a pipe. The facts of the case were not discussed, but there were questions of fact whether the ladder was an adequate safety device and, if not, whether the ladder was the proximate cause of the fall:

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) which was to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, as there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could have led a rational jury to conclude that the ladder furnished to Loretta was adequate to protect him from the hazards arising from his work. The jury could have credited Loretta’s deposition and trial testimony that he did not remember if he was twisting the vertical pipe at the time of the accident, as well as the trial testimony of the plaintiff’s engineering expert that, if the ladder did not topple over as Loretta was twisting the vertical pipe, the expert’s opinion that the ladder was an inadequate safety device would be different, to rationally conclude that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the ladder was an inadequate safety device. We also agree with the court’s determination to deny that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence. A fair interpretation of the evidence could have led the jury to reach its verdict that the ladder was an adequate safety device. Accordingly, we agree with the court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) … . Loretta v Split Dev. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 00265, Second Dept 1-16-19

 

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