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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there was a question of fact whether plaintiff’s actions constituted the sole proximate cause of his injuries in this Labor Law 240(1) action. Plaintiff fell after he had stacked two Baker scaffolds and a closed a-frame ladder on top of one another to install sheetrock:

… [T]he defendant raised a triable issue of fact as to whether pipe scaffolds, which were available to the plaintiff, constituted adequate protection for the work that the plaintiff was performing and, if so, whether the plaintiff, based on his training, prior practice, and common sense, knew or should have known to use pipe scaffolds instead of Baker scaffolds … . The defendant also raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the scaffolds alone were adequate for the job, thereby negating any need for the plaintiff to place a closed ladder on top of the scaffolds … . Therefore, the defendant submitted evidence that would permit a jury to find that “the plaintiff had adequate safety devices available; that he knew both that they were available and that he was expected to use them; that he chose for no good reason not to do so; and that had he not made that choice he would not have been injured” … . Nalvarte v Long Is. Univ., 2017 NY Slip Op 06183, Second Dept 8-16-17

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LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/SOLE PROXIMATE CASE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

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