You are here: / / PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD...
,

PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the “substantial evidence” standard did not apply to review of the Unified Court System’s finding that the court assistant (petitioner) was not asked to do out-of-title work. The “arbitrary and capricious” standard was the proper one:

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, “a substantial evidence’ question is presented only where a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing has been held”… . The fact that the petitioner had the “right to be heard . . . and to present facts in support of [his] position” at a grievance meeting …did not render the grievance meeting “a quasi-judicial proceeding involving the cross-examination of witnesses and the making of a record within the meaning of CPLR 7803(4)”… . Since the administrative determination in this case was made after a grievance meeting, as opposed to a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing, the court properly concluded that the relevant standard of review was whether the “determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” … .

The petitioner further contends that the Deputy Director’s determination was arbitrary and capricious. “An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts” … . “In applying the arbitrary and capricious’ standard, a court inquires whether the determination under review had a rational basis” … . Matter of Manning v New York State-Unified Ct. Sys., 2017 NY Slip Op 06077, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EVIDENCE, PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,  PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/QUASI-JUDICIAL (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,  PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
SCHOOL EMPLOYEE’S NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IS NOT GOVERNED BY THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA), NO NEED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DENIAL OF MEDICAL LEAVE DID NOT HAVE RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED OVER CONSTRUCTION DEBRIS IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTION, INDEMNIFICATION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY WERE FREE FROM NEGLIGENCE, BUT THE CONTRIBUTION CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED, CRITERIA FOR INDEMNIFICATION AND CONTRIBUTION EXPLAINED IN SOME DEPTH (SECOND DEPT).
THE DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEW YORK VOTING RIGHTS ACT (NYVRA) AND WAS THEREFORE INELIGIBLE FOR THE 90-DAY “SAFE HARBOR” EXTENSION TO ADDRESS THE VIOLATION OF THE NYVRA ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF-CITIZENS (SECOND DEPT).
DRAINAGE GRATE NEAR SOCCER FIELD DEEMED OPEN AND OBVIOUS, PLAINTIFF SOCCER PLAYER ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY RESULTING FROM HIS CLEAT GETTING STUCK IN THE GRATE (SECOND DEPT).
LACK OF SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF STUDENT’S FALL, PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGING IN AGE-APPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR TAKING TURNS JUMPING OVER A KNEE-HIGH FENCE WHEN SHE FELL AND WAS INJURED, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE WAS FILED IN THE WRONG COURT.
Plaintiff Wife’s Waiver of Her Entitlement (Pursuant to a Divorce Stipulation) to Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA) to Maintenance Payments (By Acceptance of Checks With No COLA for Years) Was Withdrawn In 2008 When She Commenced Suit to Enforce the COLA Provision of the Stipulation
A DEFAULTING PARTY ADMITS ALL THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT; THEREFORE LIABILITY ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AT THE INQUEST (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ADMISSION OF A CHART SHOWING THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF A GANG WAS (HARMLESS)... NO DUTY OF CARE OWED PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWN, OCCUPY OR CONTROL THE...