You are here: / / PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS...

PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS ASSIGNED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SUE DEFENDANT’S INSURER ALLEGING A BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE, THE INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there was no basis for the dismissal of Rios’s complaint alleging defendant insurer’s (Tri State’s) bad faith refusal to settle the underlying traffic-accident action for the policy limit of $100,000. Rios had collided with Weathers, who sued Rios. Weathers won a substantial verdict which was reduced by the Second Department. The Second Department ordered a new trial unless Weathers stipulated to the reduced award (which remained substantial and well above the policy limit). Weathers stipulated to most of the reduced award, but not the award for future physical therapy and medical costs. Rios then assigned his “bad faith” action against defendant insurer (Tri State) to Weathers. In moving to dismiss the Rios complaint, the insurer argued that because Weathers did not stipulate to all of the reduced award, his only remedy was a new trial:

​

Weathers, as assignee of Rios’s rights, … commenced this action alleging that Tri State acted in bad faith by refusing to settle this case before the trial for the policy limit of $100,000 and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in handling the defense of the personal injury action on behalf of Rios. Tri State moved, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Tri State argued that this Court’s decision and order in the personal injury action did not permit Weathers, the personal injury plaintiff, to pick and choose which modified awards he would accept and which awards he would reject. Tri State contended that, because Weathers did not “unconditionally accept” the reduced awards set forth in this Court’s decision and order within 30 days, he “has the right to a new trial, nothing else.” Tri State argued that the instant “bad faith” action is premature “because there is no jury verdict on damages at this stage,” and therefore, it cannot be said “that Tri State acted in bad faith for refusing to settle [the personal injury] case.” The Supreme Court denied the motion.

Under the particular circumstances of this case, Tri State has failed to establish any ground to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Although there are outstanding questions as to the total award of damages in the personal injury action, Tri State has failed to demonstrate why that prevents Weathers from maintaining an action against Tri State alleging bad faith refusal to settle and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing … . Weathers v Tri State Consumer Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 06099, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (BAD FAITH, PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS ASSIGNED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SUE DEFENDANT’S INSURER ALLEGING A BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE, THE INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (INSURANCE LAW, BAD FAITH,  PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS ASSIGNED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SUE DEFENDANT’S INSURER ALLEGING A BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE, THE INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/BAD FAITH (INSURANCE LAW, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS,  PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS ASSIGNED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SUE DEFENDANT’S INSURER ALLEGING A BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE, THE INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED TO ACQUIT ON ALL COUNTS IF THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE APPLIED, THE VERDICT SHEET DID NOT MENTION THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE WHICH MAY HAVE GIVEN THE JURY THE IMPRESSION THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY FOR EACH COUNT, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK’S MOTION TO RESTORE THE 2009 FORECLOSURE ACTION WHICH HAD BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY, BUT NOT FORMALLY, DISMISSED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE BANK HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED ITS INTENTION TO DISCONTINUE THE 2009 FORECLOSURE BUT THE MOTION TO RESTORE WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).
IF A TRIAL JUDGE DECIDES THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY ARE EXCESSIVE, THE PROPER PROCEDURE IS TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF STIPULATES TO THE REDUCED AWARD (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS PROCEEDING THROUGH AN INTERSECTION WHEN THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER ATTEMPTED A LEFT TURN, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE POLICE REPORT, PHOTOS AND DASHBOARD VIDEO WERE INADMISSIBLE AND DEFENDANT’S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS FREE FROM FAULT (SECOND DEPT).
BANK WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE DEFENDANT NOTICE OF ITS MOTIONS FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE AND JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT OCCURRED MORE THAN A YEAR BEFORE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FAILURE OF NOTICE PROPERLY RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OBJECT THAT FELL WAS THE TYPE OF OBJECT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED WITH A SAFETY DEVICE ENUMERATED IN THE LABOR LAW STATUTE.
EVIDENCE OF STANDING DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS HEARSAY EXCEPTION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE INTERNET RESEARCH TO MAKE A SUA SPONTE FINDING THAT THE BANK HAD STANDING (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Denial of Coverage Based Upon Noncooperation of the Insured Party Explained/Default Judgment In Favor of Defendant American States Re: Other Defendants Did Not Preclude, Under the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, Plaintiff’s Direct Action Against American States

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO A FINDING THAT REUNIFICATION WITH HIS MOTHER IN EL SALVADOR... UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY...