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DEFENDANT ATTORNEY COULD NOT ACT AS BOTH BROKER AND ATTORNEY IN THE SALE OF A BUSINESS, RETAINER AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE, FEES ALREADY PAID MUST BE RETURNED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly found the defendant attorney’s retainer agreement unenforceable and properly ordered the attorney to disgorge the $65,000 fee which had been paid. The attorney had agreed to acted as both a broker and attorney in the sale of a business. The sale was not completed:

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… [T]he plaintiffs established, prima facie, that the defendants acted as both attorney and broker in connection with the possible sale of the plaintiff company … , and that the retainer agreement provided for a contingency fee to compensate them in the event a sale of the company was completed. In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the retainer agreement is unenforceable because it created a nonconsentable conflict of interest under the Rules of Professional Conduct (see Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.7[a][2]; NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics Op 1015 [2014] … ). The fact that the defendants are seeking to recover under the hourly fee provision of the retainer agreement, instead of the contingency fee provision, does not alter this result. The conflict created by the contingent fee existed during the representation, regardless of whether a sale of the business was ultimately completed. Accordingly, upon renewal, the Supreme Court properly awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment dismissing the defendants’ first counterclaim to recover fees under the retainer agreement.

An attorney who violates a disciplinary rule may be discharged for cause and is not entitled to fees for any services rendered … .Here, the plaintiffs discharged the defendants for cause based on their nonconsentable conflict of interest in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) 1.7 … ). Thus, upon renewal, the Supreme Court properly awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment dismissing the defendants’ second counterclaim to recover in quantum meruit. Further, although the first cause of action is styled as one to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, it does not seek damages allegedly caused by such a breach, but merely for disgorgement of fees already paid … . Accordingly, upon renewal, the Supreme Court properly awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment on the first cause of action, in effect, to disgorge fees which had already been paid … . Jay Deitz & Assoc. of Nassau County, Ltd. v Breslow & Walker, LLP, 2017 NY Slip Op 05940, Second Dept 8-2-17

 

ATTORNEYS (DEFENDANT ATTORNEY COULD NOT ACT AS BOTH BROKER AND ATTORNEY IN THE SALE OF A BUSINESS, RETAINER AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE, FEES ALREADY PAID MUST BE RETURNED (SECOND DEPT))/BROKERS (ATTORNEYS, DEFENDANT ATTORNEY COULD NOT ACT AS BOTH BROKER AND ATTORNEY IN THE SALE OF A BUSINESS, RETAINER AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE, FEES ALREADY PAID MUST BE RETURNED (SECOND DEPT))/CONFLICT OF INTEREST (ATTORNEYS, DEFENDANT ATTORNEY COULD NOT ACT AS BOTH BROKER AND ATTORNEY IN THE SALE OF A BUSINESS, RETAINER AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE, FEES ALREADY PAID MUST BE RETURNED (SECOND DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT INDENTURE TRUSTEE DID NOT OWE PLAINTIFFS A FIDUCIARY... SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF MORE TIME TO FILE PAPERS OPPOSING...