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RAW DATA IN REPORT CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE, THEREFORE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE COLLECTION METHODS WAS NOT REQUIRED 1ST DEPT.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kahn, over an extensive, two-justice, dissenting opinion, determined a report on the DNA evidence which connected the defendant to the burglary did not violate the Confrontation Clause and was properly admitted. The majority argued that the report contained only raw data that was not part of a law enforcement effort aimed at the defendant because the sources of the DNA which were analyzed were not known to the technicians conducting the procedures. Therefore the raw data was not testimonial evidence (which would violate the Confrontation Clause). The criminologist (Huyck) who testified came to conclusions (testimonial) about the sources of the tested DNA by comparing the (non-testimonial) raw data. The report generated by the criminologist, therefore, was admissible because she testified and was cross-examined. The dissenters argued that someone involved in collecting the raw data should have testified and been cross-examined about the testing procedures (measures taken to avoid contamination, etc.):

Huyck herself conducted an independent review of the raw data derived from the testing of the DNA material derived from both the physical evidence and from defendant’s person, and was not merely “functioning as a conduit for the conclusions of others” … . …[T]he expert witness, “testified that any conclusions or opinions she reached from the raw data . . . were her own” and were not merely conclusions of others with whom she agreed … . Upon her own examination of the machine-generated graphs and raw data in this case, Huyck concluded that the two DNA profiles were a match. Her conclusion, based upon her own “separate, independent and unbiased analysis of the raw data,” was reflected in the … laboratory report bearing her name as analyst as well as in her own testimony at trial … . … Huyck did not base her testimony “solely on the reports of the nontestifying analysts [which were then] admitted into evidence for their truth.” People v Rodriguez, 2017 NY Slip Op 05799, 1st Dept 7-25-17

CRIMINAL LAW (RAW DATA IN REPORT CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE, THEREFORE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE COLLECTION METHODS WAS NOT REQUIRED 1ST DEPT)/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, RAW DATA IN REPORT CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE, THEREFORE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE COLLECTION METHODS WAS NOT REQUIRED 1ST DEPT)/TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, RAW DATA IN REPORT CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE, THEREFORE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE COLLECTION METHODS WAS NOT REQUIRED 1ST DEPT)/DNA (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, CRIMINAL LAW, RAW DATA IN REPORT CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE, THEREFORE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE COLLECTION METHODS WAS NOT REQUIRED 1ST DEPT)/CONFRONTATION CLAUSE (TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY, CRIMINAL LAW, RAW DATA IN REPORT CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE, THEREFORE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE COLLECTION METHODS WAS NOT REQUIRED 1ST DEPT)/DNA (TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY, CRIMINAL LAW, RAW DATA IN REPORT CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE, THEREFORE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE COLLECTION METHODS WAS NOT REQUIRED 1ST DEPT)/REPORTS (TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY, CRIMINAL LAW, RAW DATA IN REPORT CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE, THEREFORE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE COLLECTION METHODS WAS NOT REQUIRED 1ST DEPT)

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